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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 The theory of economic decision under uncertainty implies that individual risk 
aversion plays a role in a variety of contexts that are critical for understanding individual 
behavior.  According to theory, an individual’s risk aversion will influence any economic 
decision that involve uncertain outcomes such as occupational choice, time allocation 
between work and leisure, borrowing and lending, portfolio allocation, human capital 
investments, and business investments.  The first two chapters of this dissertation 
explore the role of measured risk aversion in a variety of labor market settings.  Because 
the theory typically presumes that individuals have time-invariant risk attitudes, the third 
chapter discusses the stability of measured risk preferences over time.  The fourth 
chapter focuses on the role of entrepreneurial ability in the decision to become a nonprofit 
entrepreneur.   
On average, women are less likely to become self-employed, earn less, and work 
fewer hours than men.  It is also widely reported that women are more risk averse than 
men.  While a vast literature has investigated the extent to which these gaps can be 
explained by differences in human capital or noncognitive skills, the link between gender 
differences in risk aversion and gender gaps in labor market outcomes has not been 
established empirically.  The first chapter examines whether gender differences in risk 
aversion explain the observed gender gaps in entrepreneurship, earnings, and hours 
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worked 
Pratt (1964) defines a risk premium as the difference between the expected return 
and the certain equivalent return.  The higher required risk premium makes it less likely 
that more risk averse agents will become an entrepreneur.  However, more risk averse 
individuals who nevertheless choose entrepreneurship should invest in venture with 
greater expected return.  Standard theoretical models of occupational choice under 
uncertainty imply a positive correlation between an individual’s degree of risk aversion 
and the expected return from an entrepreneurial venture at the time of entry.  Because 
the expected return is the risk neutral equivalent value, a higher expected return implies a 
higher survival probability.  Therefore, conditional on having entered entrepreneurship, 
more risk averse entrepreneurs should survive more frequently than their less risk averse 
counterparts.  Accordingly, the second chapter examines how measured risk aversion 
affects the success of entrepreneurial ventures.  
The theory of economic decision under uncertainty typically presumes that 
individuals have time-invariant risk preferences.  However, a series of empirical studies 
have raised doubts about the validity of the presumed stable risk preferences.  While 
those empirical studies show apparent instability of measured risk preferences, they could 
not establish a systematic pattern for the extent to which risk preferences change over 
time due partly to the relatively short time spans and few observations.  The third 
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chapter uses a large longitudinal data set to explore the long-term stability of measured 
risk preferences over time.  It also identifies regularities on how risk attitudes change in 
response to individual circumstances.  
The fourth chapter focuses on nonprofit entrepreneurship.  Incentives for starting 
a for-profit venture involve maximizing profits, while incentives for nonprofit startups are 
less clear because the objective is not tied to maximizing profits.  Accordingly, little 
attention has been paid to the role of entrepreneurial ability in the decision to become a 
nonprofit entrepreneur.  In Lazear (2005)’s model of entrepreneurship, individuals with 
more diverse academic and occupational training are more likely to become entrepreneurs 
whereas more narrowly trained individuals become employees.  Extending Lazear’s 
model, this chapter shows in theory that diverse skills should have a positive effect on the 
choice of both nonprofit and for-profit start-ups over the alternative of working for 
someone else.  Accordingly, the fourth chapter examines whether Lazear’s model can 
also explain which individuals become nonprofit entrepreneurs. 
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CHAPTER 2. DO GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RISK AVERSION EXPLAIN 
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN LABOR SUPPLY, EARNINGS, OR 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE? 
 
1. Introduction 
 On average, women are less likely to become self-employed, earn less, and work 
fewer hours than men.  While a vast literature has investigated the extent to which these 
gaps can be explained by differences in human capital, a more recent effort has found that 
noncognitive skills such as emotional stability, conscientiousness and aggression, or 
antagonism can explain some of the pay differences between men and women (Mueller 
and Plug 2006). 
Numerous studies have found that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., 
Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro 1997; Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Jonker 2002; 
Eckel and Grossman 2002; Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, and Meijers 2009; Croson and 
Gneezy 2009).  Recent experimental studies discovered that women do not perform as 
well as men in competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003; 
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Croson and Gneezy 2009).  One might presume that 
gender differences in labor market outcomes would be partially explained by such 
differences as well. 
In fact, risk preferences are commonly found to have a significant role in 
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determining entry into self-employment for men (Van Praag and Cramer 2001; Hartog et 
al. 2002; Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag 2002; Ekelud, Johansson, Jarvelin, and 
Lichtermann 2005; Kan and Tsai 2006; Ahn 2009).  Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, 
and Sunde (2007) find that less risk-averse individuals select occupations with higher 
wages and higher variation in wages.  Hence, it is tempting to presume that women’s 
greater aversion to risk and competition explains women’s lower wages and lower rate of 
entrepreneurship, as suggested by Croson and Gneezy (2009).  However, that link has 
not yet been established empirically.  To date, most studies of labor market outcomes 
tied to risk preferences have relied either on cross sectional data sets of men only or of 
pooled samples that do not estimate separate effects of risk preferences across genders.   
The exception is a study of the gender wage gap in Australia by Le, Miller, 
Slutske, and Martin (2010) which found that favorable attitudes toward financial risk 
raise earnings for both men and women, but gender differences in risk attitudes explain 
only a small part of the gender pay gap.  To our knowledge, no previous study has 
investigated the extent to which risk attitudes explain gender gaps in occupational choice 
or labor supply.  We attempt to fill the hole in the literature.  Therefore, we examine the 
role of risk aversion in explaining observed gender gaps in entrepreneurship, earnings, 
and hours worked in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979.  
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Consistent with the earlier studies, we find that less risk averse men are more 
likely to enter self-employment.  However, we find no significant effect of risk attitudes 
on women’s entrepreneurship decision.  The role of risk attitudes in earnings also differs 
by gender across employment type.  In self-employment, less risk aversion is associated 
with lower male earnings, but risk aversion has no effect on female earnings.  In paid-
employment, less risk aversion lowers male wage as it does in self-employment.  On the 
contrary, decreasing rates of risk aversion raise female wage, consistent with theoretical 
effects of risk attitudes on labor earnings, but the effects are of modest magnitude.  
Finally, we find no relationship between risk aversion and hours of labor for both men 
and women.  Consequently, a standard decomposition shows that gender differences in 
risk attitudes explain only a small fraction of the gender gap in self-employment.  
Similarly, those differences in risk aversion between men and women account for only a 
trivial portion of the gender gap in earnings and hours worked.  
2. Conceptual Framework: Choosing an Occupation, Earnings, and Hours of Labor 
 This section shows that in theory, risk attitudes should affect individual decisions 
regarding labor force entry, occupation and earnings conditional on entry, and hours of 
work.  Consequently, differences in risk attitudes between men and women potentially 
could explain some of the gender differences in these choices. 
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Individuals are assumed to choose one of three employment types: self-
employment, paid employment, or being out of labor force so as to maximize expected 
utility.  Utility depends on expected pecuniary returns from market work and utility from 
nonmarket work or leisure.  Utility is concave in earnings so that it can reflect an 
individual’s risk aversion.  Individuals form their beliefs of future earnings based on 
their human capital which contributes to his or her productivity at home or on the job.  
The reduced form utility function from an individual i choosing an employment type j is 
given by 
𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝑖𝑖, 𝜇𝑖𝐿 ,𝜃𝑖)                                             (1) 
𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑖(𝑋𝑚𝑖)                                                     (2) 
𝜇𝑖𝐿 = 𝑖(𝑋𝑚𝑖,𝑋ℎ𝑖)                                                  (3) 
where ije is work effort in j occupation (i.e., fraction of time spent in j); ijy  denotes 
expected future earnings in j which is a function of miX : the human capital that affects 
ability in the market; iLµ is known utility from nonmarket work which is determined by 
both miX and factors that influence productivity in home production, hiX ; and iθ  denotes 
a measure of i’s risk aversion.   
  Following Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008), we 
assume that individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  The associated 
utility function from employment type j is given by  
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 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the coefficient of individual i’s 
relative risk aversion; (1-eij) denotes fraction of time spent in the home; iε  is an error 
term which captures unobservable factors such as motivation and preferences for job 
attributes.   
In order to derive expected utility with respect to future earnings, we take a 
second order Taylor series expansion around the mean of future earnings ( yµ ).  For 
simplicity, the subscripts i and j are suppressed: 
𝐸�𝑈(𝜃)� ≈ 𝑈�𝜇𝑦� + 𝑈′�𝜇𝑦�𝐸�𝜃 − 𝜇𝑦� + 12 𝑈"𝐸((𝜃 − 𝜇𝑦)2) + 𝜔  
        = 𝑈�𝜇𝑦� + 12 𝑈"(𝜇𝑦)𝜎𝑦2 + 𝜔                                (5) 
where ( )y E yµ = , 
2 ( )y Var ys = , and ω is a random error due to approximation. 
The first and second order partial derivatives of the equation (4) with respect to 
y are respectively: 
𝑈′(𝜃) = 𝑒(𝜃)−𝜃  
𝑈"(𝜃) = −𝑒𝜃(𝜃)−𝜃−1                                             (6) 
Plugging equations (4) and (6) into equation (5) yields  
1
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1 2
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θ
θµ θµ s µ ω ε
θ
−
− −
 
≈ − + − + +  − 
                        (7) 
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An individual optimally allocates time between market work and nonmarket work 
by maximizing his expected utility with respect to work effort, e.  The first order 
conditions are given by equation (8). 
𝜕𝐸𝑈
𝜕𝑒
 >
<
 0 ↔  𝜇𝑦1−𝜃 � 11−𝜃 − 𝜃2 �𝜎𝑦𝜇𝑦�2� − 𝜇𝐿   ><  0                           (8) 
𝑒∗ > 0 𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝑦1−𝜃 � 11−𝜃 − 𝜃2 �𝜎𝑦𝜇𝑦�2� = 𝜇𝐿                                 (9) 
𝑒∗ = 0 𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝑦1−𝜃 � 11−𝜃 − 𝜃2 �𝜎𝑦𝜇𝑦�2� < 𝜇𝐿                                (10) 
𝑒∗ = 1 𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝑦1−𝜃 � 11−𝜃 − 𝜃2 �𝜎𝑦𝜇𝑦�2� > 𝜇𝐿                                (11) 
Equations (9), (10), and (11) show that if expected utility from earnings in the 
market at any positive e equals utility from nonmarket work or leisure, an agent allocates 
his available time between market work and nonmarket work ( * 0e > ); otherwise he will 
specialize in home production ( *e =0) or market production ( *e =1).  Clearly, a decision 
on whether to enter the labor market depends on risk aversion, human capital, and 
household characteristics so that * ( , , )m he e X Xθ= .   
In addition, if we presume that the utility from time out of the labor force is 
positive ( 0Lµ > ) then an interior solution where 0<e<1 requires that 
2
1 1
1 2
y
y
y
θ sθµ
θ µ
−
  
 −    −   
>0.  That in turn requires that the risk aversion parameter 
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individuals in the labor market, 0 < θ < 1.1   
Assuming e>0, an individual chooses self-employment if expected utility from 
selecting self-employment exceeds that from paid-employment: 
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Manipulating the expected utility in (7) yields the following condition for entering 
self-employment: 
2 2
1 11 1(1 ) (1 )
1 2 1 2
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y y
e e e eθ θ
s sθ θµ µ µ µ
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    (12) 
where subscripts s and w denote self-employment and paid-employment, respectively. 
We presume that self-employment is a riskier occupation than paid-employment.  
That means that the coefficient of variation (CV) for self-employed earnings is larger than 
the CV for salaries in paid-employment: s w
s w
y y
s w
y y
CV CV
s s
µ µ
= > = .  
The condition CVs>CVw implies that the bracket in the first term on the left hand 
side of (12) is smaller than the bracketed term on the right hand side.  Hence, other 
things equal, expected return from self-employment needs to be higher than that from 
                                            
1 The theoretical models of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) assumed 
relative risk aversion is less than one. However, empirical estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient 
are often larger than one. For examples, Hansen and Singleton (1983) find relative risk aversion in the range 
from 0 to 2 whereas Pålsson (1996) finds it in the range between 2 and 4.   
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paid-employment in order for any risk averse individual to enter self-employment:
s wy y
µ µ> .2   
We are interested in assessing how increases in risk aversion affect the expected 
return from occupational choice at a fixed level of work effort.  We first simulate the 
effect of risk aversion on expected utility from market work in equation (12).  Figure 1 
illustrates how expected utility from market work in each occupation changes as risk 
aversion increases.  Graphs display various conditions on 
sy
µ , 
wy
µ , CVs , and CVw.  
As shown in Figure 1, as θ increases, expected utility from market work decreases 
in both self-employment and paid-employment.  However, expected utility declines 
faster in self-employment than paid-employment and so paid employment becomes more 
attractive as θ increases.  This evidence suggests that more risk averse agents who 
nevertheless choose self-employment will require a higher expected return from self-
employment, and so syµ must increase in θ.  The reverse is true for the effect of θ on 
expected earnings in paid employment.  A more risk averse individual requires lower 
expected return than their less risk averse counterparts when they choose paid-
employment.  See the Appendix 1 for the proofs.   
Risk aversion has an ambiguous effect on work effort, whether in self-
employment (es) or wage work (ew).  The reason is that effort depends on the utility from 
                                            
2 Note that expected utility is increasing in expected return. 
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nonmarket work.  Assuming 0 < e < 1, more risk averse individuals who receive high 
utility from nonmarket work or leisure will reduce work effort in the market production 
because increases in θ decrease utility from market work at any level of expected earnings.  
The reverse is true for those who have low utility from nonmarket work: more risk 
aversion increases market work effort in order to scale up the decreased utility from 
market work.  See the Appendix 2 for the derivation. 
We have shown that in reduced form, individual decisions on labor force 
participation, occupational choice, earnings, and work effort will depend on the 
individual’s degree of risk aversion as well as on predetermined skills in market and 
nonmarket production.3  Given the frequently reported finding that women are more risk 
averse than men, it is natural to presume that gender differences in risk attitudes would 
play a role in explaining widely observed gender gaps in these labor market outcomes.  
Accordingly, we will examine the extent to which differences in measured risk aversion 
between men and women can explain differences between the sexes in labor force 
participation, entrepreneurial entry, earnings, and hours worked.  
3. Methods 
                                            
3 Assuming constant absolute risk aversion generates the same predictions. See the appendix 3.  
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 To examine the influence of risk aversion on occupational choice, we employ a 
multinomial logit model using a random utility model approach.  We run separate 
estimations for men and women for an appropriate comparison of the two groups.  
The predicted probability that an individual i chooses employment mode j is given 
by 
3
1
1 1 2 3I Iij i i j i j i k i k i
k
Pr( C | ,X ) exp( X ) exp( X ), j , ,θ δ θ β δ θ β
=
′ ′= = + + =∑        (13) 
where j=1 for self-employment, 2 for paid-employment and 3 for out of labor force; the 
superscript I indicates an estimate of a categorical risk attitude index; and θi is a 
categorical variable indicating attitudes toward risk with higher levels indicating greater 
acceptance of risk.  Our primary interest is in establishing the sign and significance of 
the coefficient on risk attitudes, Ijδ .  We also include a vector Xi that contains controls 
for heterogeneity in tastes and skills including wealth, total number of children, presence 
of preschool or school age child (age 0~6, 7~12), marital status, education, previous labor 
market experience, health condition, parental education and occupational background, 
and other demographic variables such as age and four regions. 
It may be possible that measures of risk aversion are non-linear.  As an 
alternative specification, we replace θi  by three dummy variables Dli, l =2, 3, 4; 
indicating progressively lower levels of risk aversion with unwillingness to take on any 
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risk as the reference category ( 1=l ).  The associated predicted probability that 
individual i chooses employment mode j is given by 
Pr�𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝐷,𝑋� = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 �∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑖𝐷4𝑙=2 𝐷𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑋𝑖� ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝�∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑘𝑋𝑖4𝑙=2 �3𝑘=1�  (14) 
Next, we want to explore the relationship between degree of risk aversion and 
earnings and hours worked by gender.  As men and women will be selecting hours and 
wages at the same time they are selecting occupation, those decisions will be subject to 
the same human capital and socio-demographic factors.  
ln g Iik k i k i k i ik i k ikY Z Xδ θ α γ λ ε α ε′= + + + ≡ +                             (15)                                          
ln g Iik k i k i k i ik i k ikh Z Xδ θ α γ λ ε ψ ε′= + + + ≡ +     , k=s, w;  g=m, f              (16) 
where k=s for self-employment, w for paid-employment; g=m for male and g=f for 
female; vector Zi contains the same variables as those in Xi except wealth and parental 
occupational background.  We only observe earnings and hours of work conditional on 
labor market entry, and so the earnings and labor supply equations also include a 
correction ( )
( )
i k
ik
i k
z
z
φ η
λ
η
=
Φ
 for sample selection bias based on the procedure by Heckman 
(1976; 1979).  The zi  augments vector Xi with risk aversion θi.   
4. Data and Sample 
 The data source for the analysis is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 79 (NLSY79) for the period between 1993 and 2002.  The NLSY79 includes 
12,686 individuals who were 14-22 years old in the initial survey year.  6,933 
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individuals aged between 28 and 45 were interviewed during the observation periods.  
Employment type is identified by using "class of worker" category, which indicates 
whether a respondent was employed by a private sector or government or was self-
employed.  We classify those who ever started a business in the period between 1994 
and 2002 as self-employed.  Hence, self-employment is identified using a 9-year 
longitudinal horizon to reflect long-term planning horizon that we presume applies to 
occupational choice.  As a consequence, in our data, the decision to become self-
employed is made between ages 29 and 45.  Schiller and Crewson (1997) also suggested 
that a longer life-cycle view for entrepreneurs would be preferred in the sense that new 
entrepreneurs may emerge in later years.   
Those who never have a spell of self-employment but did work for pay were 
placed in the wage worker category over the 9-year time window.  Respondents that did 
not report at least one employment spell over the period are considered out of the labor 
force.   
Earnings are measured by the hourly pay rate.  Although total annual earnings 
from wage and/or business in the previous calendar year can be identified in the NLSY79, 
there are many missing values for self-employment earnings.  Roughly 50 percent of the 
self-employed reported zero business earnings and about 11 percent of the self-employed 
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with positive total annual earnings report zero income.4 This may be due to self-
employed reporting their income as wage or salary income (Fairlie 2005).  Because of 
the low response rate for the total annual business earnings, we incorporate earnings 
measured by hourly pay rate.  For example, if a respondent identified himself as self-
employed and reported hourly pay rate, we treat the self-reported hourly pay rate as self-
employment hourly earnings.  Because the observation time is between 1994 and 2002, 
we average their earnings over the years.  Earnings are inflated by the CPI-U in 2002 
dollars.  Hours worked per week are also averaged over the years.  
We drop those who were in military service or in school.  We also drop 
individuals for whom critical information is missing.  Finally, we exclude individuals 
who were already self-employed in 1993 to avoid reverse causal effects of experience of 
business ownership on risk attitudes.  Therefore, the risk preference is measured before 
the spell of self-employment is initiated.5  The final sample includes 5,443 individuals; 
2,662 males and 2,781 females.  
The distributions of employment type by gender over the period between 1994 
and 2002 are summarized in Table 1. 
                                            
4 NLSY79 asked respondents a question of “Did you receive earnings from business or farm in the past 
year?” In the following question, they were asked “what are total annual earnings from business or farm in 
the past calendar year?” In our data, 11% of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question over the 
observation years actually reported zero earnings.  
5 Individuals’ risk attitudes in this study are elicited in 1993.   
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The longer time period eliminates most of the differences in labor force 
participation between men and women.  Only 6 % of women and 3% of men were never 
employed over the 9 years.  As shown, self-employment entry rate for women (13%) is 
lower than that for men (16%).  Likewise, the proportion of male wage workers (82%) is 
slightly larger than that for females (80%).  Table 2 reports a summary of self-
employment rates, log hourly earnings, and log hours worked across employment types 
by gender.   
Women earn less than men and they also work fewer hours than men regardless of 
employment type.  These differences in self-employment, earnings and labor supply 
between men and women are statistically significant, consistent with what has been found 
in the previous literature.  Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the analysis are reported separately by gender in Table 3. 
4.1 Measures of risk attitudes 
The willingness to take financial risk is measured by a categorical variable with 
four levels.  In the 1993 NLSY79, respondents were asked the following questions: 
(Q1) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your 
(family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you 
take the new job? 
 
The individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked:  
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(Q2) suppose the changes were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it 
would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job? Those who answered ‘no’ to the first 
question (Q1) then were asked: (Q3) suppose the changes were 50-50 that it would double your 
(family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent. Would you take the new job? 
We use the responses to the series of questions in order to place each respondent 
into one of four risk categories (1-4).  The four risk index categories, ranging from the 
most risk averse (category1) to the least risk averse (category4), are as followed: 
1
2
3
4
riskindex


= 

 if
if
if
if
YesQ
YesQ
NoQ
NoQ
=
=
=
=
1
1
1
1
&
&
&
&
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=
=
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2
2
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cut
cut
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31
&
&
&
&
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cut
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Because of the possibility of non-linear measures of risk attitudes, we replace the 
risk attitude index with four dummy variables to distinguish between levels of risk 
aversion: willingness to take 1) No risk; 2) Average risk; 3) Above average risk; 4) 
Substantial risk.  The distribution of risk aversion across types of employment by gender 
is presented in Table 4.  
The first two columns show risk aversion for male and female entrepreneurs.  
Surprisingly, both self-employed men and women are most commonly found in the most 
risk averse group: 36% of male and 44% of female entrepreneurs.  However, the 
proportion of paid employees in the most risk averse category is even larger, consistent 
with the presumption that more risk averse individuals are more likely to select paid-
employment over self-employment.  Consistent with that supposition, 55% of male 
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entrepreneurs are in the two least risk averse categories compared to only 43% of paid 
employees.  Differences in risk aversion between female self-employed and paid-
employed are less pronounced: 43% of female entrepreneurs and 37% of female paid 
employees are in the two least risk averse groups.  On the surface, it appears that risk 
aversion has a smaller effect on female entrepreneurial entry than it does on male 
entrepreneurship.    
Columns (3) and (6) in Table 4 present two-sample t tests between men and 
women within occupation.  Women are significantly more risk averse than men 
regardless of occupation.  Columns (7) and (8) test for differences in risk aversion 
between the self-employed and the paid-employed.  Entrepreneurs are less risk averse 
than are paid employees for both genders, but the differences are only marginally 
significant for women.  Nor is the more modest gap in risk aversion between women 
self- and paid-employees due to less variation in risk attitudes among women.  Variation 
in risk attitudes across women is comparable to the variation in risk attitudes for men as 
shown in the final row of Table 4.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Effect of risk aversion on occupational choice by gender 
 In order to examine the influence of risk attitudes on occupational choice by 
gender, separate equations (13) and (14) were estimated for samples of men and women 
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using a multinomial logit model.  The estimated marginal effects are reported in Table 5 
in two panels.   
In Panel A, degree of risk aversion is measured by the four point risk attitude 
index that goes from most (1) to least (4) risk averse.  In order to allow for a possible 
non- monotonic relationship between the probability of entry into self-employment and 
the degree of risk aversion, we replace the risk attitude index with three dummy variables 
that indicate degree of willingness to take risk, considering willingness to take “no risk” 
as the reference category.  Those estimates are reported in Panel B.  
Turning first to the control measures, wealth increases the probability of moving 
into self-employment rather than being paid-employed for both men and women, 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (Evans and Leighton 1989; Evans and 
Jovanovic 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Fairlie 2002).  In line with Schiller 
and Crewson (1997), more employment experiences induce women to stay in paid 
employment and discourage them from transitioning into self-employment.  Conversely, 
men with more work experience are more likely to enter self-employment instead of paid-
employment.  Health limitations encourage men to work in their own business.  For 
women, those who reported health limitations tend to exit the labor force rather than enter 
the labor market. 
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Age, education and race have no significant effect on an employment choice 
regardless of gender.  Lack of explanatory power of age might be because there are not 
enough variations in age in our sample.  Having entrepreneurial or professional parents 
has no significant effect on the probability of becoming self-employment for both men 
and women.6   
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, more favorable attitudes toward risk raise the 
probability of being self-employed by 2.4 % and reduce the incidence of selecting paid-
employment by 2.4% among men.  The finding is as predicted in the theory and is also 
consistent with the previous literature on risk preferences (Kanbur 1979; Kihlstrom and 
Laffont 1979, Parker 1997; Van Praag and Cramer 2001; Hartog et al. 2002; Cramer et al. 
2002; Ekelund et al. 2005; Kan and Tsai 2006; Ahn, T. 2009).7  However, there is no 
statistically significant effect of risk aversion on the probability that women enter either 
self-employment or paid-employment.  Although the signs of the coefficients are the 
same as those for men, the magnitudes of the marginal effects for women are less than 
one-tenth those for men.  Measured risk aversion does not affect the labor force 
participation decision for either men or women.  
                                            
6 Manager, official and proprietor are in the same occupational category for parental occupational 
background in the NLSY79. 
7 These studies have relied either on data sets of men only or of pooled samples of men and women. 
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As the alternative specification shows in Panel B, for men, the marginal effects of 
the three risk attitude dummy variables on entry decision into self-employment are all 
positive and the size of the marginal effect gets progressively larger as willingness to take 
risk increases.  For example, an individual who is willing to take above average risk 
(substantial risk) has a 5.8% (7.6%) higher probability of being self-employed relative to 
the individual who is unwilling to take any risk.  For women, on the other hand, the 
signs and magnitudes of the marginal effect of risk attitudes on self-employment do not 
follow a systematic pattern and are never statistically significant.  While risk attitudes 
play a key role in choosing entrepreneurship for men, they have no significant effect on 
women’s occupational choices.8   
This finding suggests that men and women place different weights on future 
earnings in self-employment.  Limited evidence on the motivations for entering self-
employment may support this conjecture.  For example, Georgellis and Wall (2005) 
found that larger expected earnings premia for self-employment versus paid-employment 
increases entrepreneurial entry for men but not women.  Clain (2000) showed that full-
time self-employed women have characteristics that are less valued in the market 
compared to full-time paid-employed women.  For men, the reverse is true, suggesting 
                                            
8 This study avoids a problem that the risk preferences is measure after the spell of self-employment is 
initiated by dropping those who were already self-employed when their risk attitudes were measured in 
1993. Hartog et al. (2002) argue that ideally risk aversion should be measured before individuals make self-
employment decision. Consequently, 402 observations were omitted from the sample.  The results are, 
however, robust to including these individuals in the sample (See the Appendix 4). 
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that women may place a higher value on non-pecuniary aspects of self-employment than 
do men.   
5.2 Effect of risk aversion on hours and earnings by gender across employment type 
 In this subsection, we examine the potential role of risk aversion on earnings and 
work hours by gender.  As shown in section 2, a more risk averse agent requires higher 
expected earnings from self-employment whereas the more risk averse accepts lower 
expected earnings from paid-employment.  The estimates of earnings model are reported 
in Panel A of Table 6. 
Consistent with the theory, greater risk aversion increases male returns to self-
employment.  However, there is no significant effect of measured risk aversion on the 
earnings of the female self-employed.  The coefficient on risk aversion for women is 
less than 98% of the size for men.  This is consistent with our earlier finding that risk 
aversion does not affect women’s entry decision on self-employment.   
For men engaged in wage work, willingness to accept risk is associated with lower 
male wage which is inconsistent with theory.  The most risk averse are paid almost 12% 
more than the least risk averse.  The least risk averse women are paid more in wage 
work consistent with the theory, although the differences are small.  Going from the 
least to the most risk averse lowers pay by 6%.9  
                                            
9 Estimates of log annual earnings are reported in Appendix 5.  The signs on risk preferences are 
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Risk aversion can also affect hours of labor supplied although the direction of the 
effect is ambiguous.  We estimated equation (16) and report the estimated risk aversion 
effect by gender and employment type in Panel B of Table 6.  The complete results from 
the labor supply estimation are presented in Appendix 6.  As with our labor force 
participation results, there is no significant relationship between risk attitudes and hours 
of work for either men or women.  
5.3 Do gender differences in risk aversion explain the observed gender gaps in the 
labor market outcomes? 
 Given our behavioral estimates of the entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and hours 
of labor supply decisions, we can now assess the extent to which gender differences in 
risk aversion explain the gender gaps in these labor market outcomes.   
To measure how much differences in risk aversion between men and women 
explain the gender gap in entrepreneurial choice, we apply Fairlie’s (1999) nonlinear 
variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.  The difference in probability of self-
employment across genders is given by  
1 1
( ) ( )m ff m m f f f f fN Nm f i i
s s m f
i i
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N N
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= =
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      (17) 
                                                                                                                                  
consistent with those from log hourly earnings although the estimates lose precision. 
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where N j is the sample size for gender j; sP  is the probability of choosing self-
employment; gX  for g=m, f are identical to the gX  in (13).   
 The standard linear decomposition introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973) is applied for earnings and labor supply differences:  
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ( ) ( )m f m f f m m fik ik k k k k k kY Y X X Xα α α− = − + −                             (18) 
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ( ) ( )m f m f f m m fik ik k k k k k kh h X X Xψ ψ ψ− = − + −                             (19) 
where gX  for g=m, f are the same as those in (15).   
We only report the first component of the decomposition that captures 
contributions from differences in observed risk aversion between men and women.  The 
weighted female coefficients in (17), (18), and (19) can be replaced by male’s estimates 
or pooled estimates.  
Table 7 reports percentage contribution of risk attitudes to the gender gaps in three 
outcomes by employment type.   
The percentage contribution is calculated as estimated coefficient from 
decomposition dividing by mean difference in outcome (i.e., entrepreneurial choice, 
earnings, or hours of work) and then multiplying by 100.  The female coefficients from 
Table 6 are used in specification 1 and the male coefficients are applied in specification 2.  
Estimates for a pooled sample of men and women are incorporated in specification 3. 
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Conclusions based on the decomposition analysis are sensitive to the choice of 
coefficient on self-employment.10  For instance, gender differences in risk aversion 
explain 2% of the entrepreneurial choice gap between men and women in the female-
weighted decomposition, but 12 % of the gap in the male-weighted decomposition.  
Similarly, if women had risk aversion equal to those of men, their entrepreneurial 
earnings would be only about 1% less if we take women’s coefficients as weights, but 
would be 19% lower using men’s coefficients.  Regardless of choice of coefficients 
applied, risk aversion explains little of the difference in hours worked or earnings from 
wage work between men and women. 
Most commonly, researchers use the male coefficients in decompositions because 
of a presumption that the male coefficients are not subject to discrimination.  However, 
this application reflects behavioral decisions regarding occupation, earnings, and hours 
worked.  Therefore, it is appropriate to see how a woman with risk aversion equivalent 
to those of a male would have affected her behavioral decisions regarding choice of 
occupation and associated occupational earnings and hours of work.  That argument 
suggests that we should use the female-weighted decomposition to analyze how much 
risk aversion would affect female labor market outcomes.11   
                                            
10 This is a common problem so called “index number problem” in the standard decomposition. See 
Oaxaca (1973) for more detail. 
11 For a linear case, �?̅?𝑚 − ?̅?𝑓�?̂?𝑓 = ?̅?𝑚?̂?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑓?̂?𝑓. The first term is counterfactual earnings that women 
would have if women had men’s risk aversion level. The second term is actual earnings. Expected change in 
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Using that criterion, risk aversion explains only 1.9% of the gap in entrepreneurial 
choice between men and women.  Equalizing risk aversion across the genders would 
alter relative women’s pay by only about 1% in either self-employment or paid-
employment.12 Likewise, equalizing risk aversion would change relative women’s hours 
of work by less than1% in both occupations.   
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
 The aim of this subsection is to show the extent to which conclusions regarding 
the impact of risk aversion on labor market choices are robust to changes in specification.  
The first change is to replace all individual attributes that were averaged over the 9 year 
estimation window with their start-of-period (i.e., 1993) values.  Second, different time 
spans for observing labor market outcomes are used: 1994-1996, 1994-1998 and 1994-
2000.  Finally, potentially endogenous variables such as number of children, presence of 
young children and wealth are excluded as control variables from the estimation.  The 
estimated marginal effects of risk attitudes are presented in Table 8.   
The main estimation results are reported in the first row for reference.  In all 
instances, we find that increasing willingness to accept risk raises the probability of self-
                                                                                                                                  
women’s entrepreneurial choice can be measured as the same way. 
12 The trivial role of risk aversion in explaining gender gaps in entrepreneurship and the associated 
earnings in self-employment is also consistent with the finding that risk aversion matters for men’s 
entrepreneurial choice and earnings but not for women’s cases, which gives us the validity of focusing on 
the female-weighted decomposition.  
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employment and lowers the probability of wage work only for men.  However, degree of 
risk aversion does not affect women’s occupational choices in all specifications.  
We use the same modifications to our specifications to evaluate the robustness of 
our results for earnings and labor supply.  The results reported in Table 9 show that the 
signs on risk aversion are stable in most cases.  When signs are not consistent with the 
main estimates the significance level falls below 10%. 
Table 10 reports contributions of risk aversion to the gender gap in entrepreneurial 
choice, earnings, and hours of labor supply.  We only focus on the specification 1 
(female-weighted decomposition) and so we are assessing how women’s estimated 
behavioral choices would have been different if they had the risk aversion of an average 
male in the population.   
Depending on the specification, differences in risk aversion explain only 0.1% to 
4.5% of the gap in entrepreneurial choice between men and women.  With one 
exception, the entrepreneurial earnings gap would be even larger if women had the same 
level of risk acceptance as men.  The gender pay gap for wage work and for hours 
worked are also largely unaffected by differences in risk aversion between men and 
women with the explained gap rarely exceeding 1% in absolute value.  In short, the 
commonly observed differences in risk aversion across genders explain little of the 
observed gaps in labor market outcomes between men and women.  
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6. Conclusion 
 This study examines the extent to which gender differences in risk aversion can 
explain male-female gaps in self-employment rate, earnings, and labor supply.  
Exploiting a 9-year longitudinal sample of men and women in the NLSY79, we confirm 
the standardized gender gap reported in the previous literature: on average, women are 
less likely to become self-employed, earn less and work fewer hours than men.  
Furthermore, NLSY79 shows that considerable differences in measured risk aversion 
between men and women exist: women are more risk averse than men.   
 We find that risk aversion is an important factor that affects occupational choice 
for men—less risk averse men tend to become self-employed and more risk averse men 
become wage workers.  However, there is no relationship between degree of risk 
aversion and occupational choice for women.  A different role of risk aversion in 
earnings by gender across employment type is also found.  Less risk aversion is 
associated with lower male earnings in self-employment.  On the other hand, there is no 
significant effect of measured risk aversion on female entrepreneurial earnings.  In paid-
employment, less risk aversion lowers the male wage whereas it raises female wages.  
Finally, we find no relationship between risk aversion and hours of labor for both men 
and women across employment type.      
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The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that gender differences in risk aversion 
explain only small part of gender gap in self-employment rate.  Similarly, those 
differences in risk aversion account for only a trivial portion of the gender gap in hours 
worked or earnings.  The results hold up well against a variety of sensitivity checks.  
These findings suggest that widely reported differences in risk aversion across genders do 
not play a role in explaining differences in labor market outcomes between men and 
women. 
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Figure 1. Change in expected utility from market work associated with various expected 
return and coefficient variation as risk aversion (θ) increases. 
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Note: CVs and CVw denote coefficient variation in self-employment and paid-employment, respectively. 
The case of CVw<CVs<1 is not considered because if both CVs and CVw are less than 1, there is little 
difference in risk between s and w.  
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Table 1. Distribution of employment status (1994~2002) by gender aged 29~45 
Employment status Men Women Total 
Self-employed 423 
(15.9%) 
367 
(13.2%) 
790 
Paid- employed 2,172 
(81.6%) 
2,236 
(80.4%) 
4,408 
Out of labor force 67 
(2.5%) 
178 
(6.4%) 
245 
Total 2,662 2,781 5,443 
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Table 2. Self-employment rate, hourly earnings and labor supply by gender 
                    Mean (std) 
  (1) Men (2) Women (3) Mean 
Differences 
Self-employment Self-employment rate 0.16 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(2.82) 
 Log hourly earnings 7.20 
(0.93) 
6.80 
(1.05) 
0.39*** 
(0.07) 
 Obs. 397 328  
 Log hours worked 3.88 
(0.38) 
3.51 
(0.68) 
0.36*** 
(0.04) 
 Obs. 364 307  
Paid-employment Log hourly earnings 7.53 
(0.59) 
7.22 
(0.59) 
0.31*** 
(0.02) 
 Obs. 2,159 2,216  
 Log hours worked 3.80 
(0.00) 
3.60 
(0.01) 
0.20*** 
(0.01) 
 Obs. 2,148 2,171  
Note: Column (3) is two-sample t-test between men and women 
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Table 3. Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Definition 
Men Women 
 Mean (Std) Mean (Std) 
Risk acceptance index (1-4) Four point risk attitude index: increasing in 
willingness to take financial risk 
2.29 (1.28)   2.09(1.22) 
Willingness to take:    
No risk =1 if risk index=1 0.44 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
Average risk =1 if risk index=2 0.11 (0.31) 0.13 (0.33) 
Above average risk =1 if risk index=3 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) 
Substantial risk =1 if risk index=4 0.28 (0.45) 0.21 (0.41) 
log(net-asset) Difference between all asset values and all debts 14.23 (0.33) 14.21 (0.45) 
Education Years of schooling completed 12.81 (2.41) 12.84 (2.36) 
Work experience (in year) Years of employment experience 14.67 (4.09)  11.97(5.38) 
Number of kids Number of bio/step/adopted children in HH 1.17 (1.15)   1.67(1.17) 
Presence of pre-school kid =1 if pre-school age child (age<6) is present 0.32 (0.33) 0.35 (0.34) 
Presence of school kid =1 if a child aged 7 to 12 is present 0.16 (0.21) 0.26 (0.22) 
Age Age in years 35.69 (2.28) 35.81(2.23) 
Married, spouse present =1 if married and spouse present 0.56 (0.43) 0.55 (0.44) 
Health limitation =1 if health problem limits ability to work  0.08 (0.21)   0.12(0.24) 
White =1 if white 0.64 (0.48)   0.63(0.48) 
Father education Years of schooling his/her father completed 10.70 (4.22) 10.48 (4.15) 
Father professional/proprietor =1 if father has/had professional/proprietor 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 
Mother education Years of schooling his/her mother completed 10.81 (3.27) 10.63 (3.13) 
Mother professional/proprietor =1 if mother has/had professional/proprietor 0.03 (0.16)   0.02(0.14) 
Urban =1 if reside in urban area 0.76 (0.34) 0.76 (0.34) 
Northeast =1 if reside in northeast 0.34 (0.36) 0.16 (0.36) 
North central =1 if reside in north central 0.24 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 
South =1 if reside in south 0.41 (0.48)   0.42(0.48) 
West =1 if reside in west 0.18 (0.37) 0.17 (0.37) 
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Table 4. Measured risk preferences by occupational choice and gender 
Note: Column (3), (6) are two-sample t test between men and women within self-employment and paid-employment, 
respectively. Column (7), (8) are two-sample t test between self- and paid-employment within gender and risk aversion. 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. t-statistics are in bracket. 
  
 Self-employment Paid-employment Mean(Self)-Mean(paid) 
Risk index 
(1) 
men 
(2) 
women 
   (3) 
Mean diff. 
(4)  
men 
(5)  
women 
(6)  
Mean diff. 
(7) 
Men 
(8) 
Women 
1:  unwilling to take financial risk (most risk averse category)   
Observation 151 
(36%) 
162 
(44%) 
 992 
(45%) 
1,125 
(50%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.359 
(0.02) 
0.444 
(0.03) 
-0.085 
[2.44]*** 
0.455 
(0.01) 
0.502 
(0.01) 
-0.047*** 
[3.10] 
-0.097*** 
[3.67] 
-0.058** 
[ 2.07] 
2: willing to take average risk   
Observation 38 
(9%) 
48 
(13%) 
 252 
(12%) 
278 
(12%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.090 
(0.01) 
0.132 
(0.02) 
-0.041* 
[1.85] 
0.115 
(0.01) 
0.123 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
[0.82] 
-0.025 
[1.50] 
0.008 
[0.43] 
3: willing to take above average risk   
Observation 88 
(21%) 
78 
(21%) 
 355 
(16%) 
379 
(17%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.209 
(0.02) 
0.214 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
[0.16] 
0.163 
(0.01) 
0.170 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
[0.62] 
0.046** 
[2.30] 
0.044** 
[2.04] 
4:willing to take substantial risk (least risk averse category)   
Observation 144 
(34%) 
77 
(21%) 
 582 
(27%) 
456 
(20%)  
  
Mean 
 
0.342 
(0.02) 
0.211 
(0.02) 
0.131*** 
[4.12] 
0.267 
(0.01) 
0.205 
(0.01) 
0.062*** 
[4.84] 
0.076*** 
[3.18] 
0.006 
[0.28] 
Total Obs. 421 
(100%) 
365 
(100%) 
 2,181 
(100%) 
2,238 
(100%) 
   
Risk 
acceptance 
index 
2.53 
(1.29) 
2.19 
( 1.21) 
0.343*** 
[3.83] 
2.24 
( 1.28) 
2.076 
(1.22) 
0.163*** 
[4.34] 
0.294*** 
[4.33] 
0.115* 
[1.68] 
Coefficient of 
Variation  
0.510 0.553 
 
0.571 0.588 
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Table 5. Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Determinants of Occupational Choice for Men and Women 
(1994~2002) 
 Men Women 
 Self- 
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Panel A       
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 0.024*** 
(3.86) 
-0.024*** 
(3.86) 
1.91e-07 
(0.87) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(0.81) 
Education -0.002 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-3.66e-07 
(1.31) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
0.000 
(0.53) 
Age -0.106 
(1.04) 
0.106 
(1.04) 
5.90e-06 
(1.07) 
-0.043 
(0.39) 
0.047 
(0.43) 
-0.004 
(0.48) 
Age squared 0.002 
(0.95) 
-0.002 
(0.95) 
-9.27e-08 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
Work experience 0.005* 
(1.74) 
-0.005* 
(1.74) 
-3.28e-07   
(1.30) 
-0.005** 
(2.35) 
0.007***   
(3.37) 
-0.002*** 
(3.85) 
log(net asset) 0.072*** 
(2.98) 
-0.072*** 
(2.98) 
3.16e-07 
(0.37) 
0.057** 
(2.30) 
-0.063** 
(2.55) 
0.007** 
(2.62) 
White 0.022 
(1.12) 
-0.022 
(1.12) 
1.15e-08 
(0.02) 
0.022 
(1.09) 
-0.023 
(1.10) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
Married, spouse present 0.023 
(0.79) 
-0.023 
(0.79) 
3.24e-07   
(0.34) 
0.017 
(0.75) 
-0.021 
(0.93) 
0.004* 
(1.94) 
Number of Kids  -0.012 
(0.87) 
0.012 
(0.87) 
6.62e-08 
(0.17) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(1.01) 
Presence of young kids (0~6) -0.032 
(0.80) 
0.032 
(0.80) 
-2.97e-07 
(0.23) 
0.042 
(1.24) 
-0.054 
(1.58) 
0.012*** 
(2.99) 
Presence of young kids (7~12) -0.120*  
(1.88) 
0.120* 
(1.88) 
2.82e-07   
(0.16) 
-0.043 
(0.93) 
0.049 
(1.05) 
-0.006 
(1.47) 
Health limitation to work 0.094* 
(1.92) 
-0.094* 
(1.92) 
4.27e-06 
(1.27) 
0.043 
(1.13) 
-0.054   
(1.41) 
0.011***   
(2.99) 
Mother’s education 0.006 
(1.58) 
-0.006 
(1.58) 
3.41e-08 
(0.37) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.000 
(0.45) 
Father’s education 0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
-1.44e-08 
(0.22) 
0.003   
(1.11) 
-0.004 
(1.25) 
0.000* 
(1.72) 
Mother-professional/proprietor -0.005 
(0.11) 
0.005 
(0.11) 
-2.96e-06 
(1.16) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0.56) 
Father-professional/proprietor -0.030 
(1.30) 
0.030 
(1.30) 
-0.0001 
(1.10) 
0.045 
(1.48) 
-0.046 
(1.52) 
0.002   
(0.51) 
Urban -0.023 
(0.94) 
0.023 
(0.94) 
1.33e-06 
(1.14) 
-0.020 
(0.79) 
0.017 
(0.67) 
0.003    
(1.39) 
Panel B       
Willingness to take:       
Average risk 0.006 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.00) 
-1.84e-06 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
Above average risk 0.058** 
(2.18) 
-0.058** 
(2.18) 
1.91e-08 
(0.00) 
0.033 
(1.34) 
-0.030 
(1.23) 
-0.003* 
(1.74) 
Substantial risk 0.076*** 
(3.32) 
-0.076*** 
(3.32) 
1.19e-08 
(0.00) 
-0.011 
(0.48) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.34) 
Note: 1) The reference category in Panel B is willingness to take “no risk”. 2) Same control variables as Panel A are 
included in Panel B and C. 3) 4 regions are also included in all Panels) 4) Standard errors can be provided on request 
4)***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table 6. Estimates of Earnings and labor supply for self-employed, paid-employed by gender 
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Panel A log hourly earnings     
Risk acceptance index -0.192*** (3.54) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.039*** 
(3.20) 
0.020** 
(2.12) 
Education 0.081*** (3.48) 
0.021 
(0.59) 
0.085*** 
(14.75) 
0.080*** 
(13.28) 
Age 0.889 (1.27) 
-0.632 
(0.74) 
-0.238 
(1.61) 
-0.123 
(0.78) 
Age squared -0.013 (1.16) 
0.009 
(0.68) 
0.004* 
(1.66) 
0.001 
(0.60) 
Work experience -0.031 (1.47) 
0.043** 
(2.54) 
0.031*** 
(7.83) 
0.049*** 
(9.49) 
White -0.014 (0.11) 
-0.189 
(0.99) 
0.053* 
(1.79) 
-0.013 
(0.43) 
Married 0.051 (0.30) 
-0.501** 
(2.61) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.074** 
(2.28) 
Number of kids -0.010 (0.12) 
-0.038 
(0.44) 
0.028 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(0.80) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 0.152 (0.61) 
-0.497* 
(1.68) 
0.140** 
(2.45) 
-0.111** 
(2.14) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 1.120*** (2.99) 
0.077 
(0.21) 
0.251*** 
(2.96) 
0.049 
(0.71) 
Health problem -0.788** (2.52) 
-0.620* 
(1.85) 
-1.091*** 
(7.92) 
-0.283*** 
(4.12) 
Mother education -0.066*** (3.19) 
-0.016 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
Father education 0.027* (1.68) 
0.005 
(0.25) 
0.004 
(1.04) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
Urban 0.207 (1.29) 
0.268 
(1.23) 
0.107*** 
(2.98) 
0.131*** 
(3.63) 
Years in business 0.121*** (3.19) 
0.159** 
(2.53) 
- - 
Heckman’s selection -9.032*** (3.94) 
-13.100*** 
(3.07) 
4.731*** 
(6.06) 
1.097* 
(1.85) 
R2 0.2327 0.2025 0.3403 0.3611 
N 309 242 1651 1530 
Panel B log hours of labor     
Risk acceptance index -0.030 (1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
R2 0.153 0.201 0.059 0.223 
N 277 221 1629 1488 
Note: Risk acceptance index is measured by a categorical variable from the most (1) to the least risk averse. In Panel A, 
average hourly earnings are dependent variable. In Panel B, average hours worked per week are dependent variable. 
Same controls in Panel A are used in Panel B. Four regions are controlled in both Panels. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*/**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. The complete results from the labor supply estimation are 
presented in Appendix 5. 
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Table 7. Decomposition for occupational choice, earnings and labor supply models: estimates of 
percentage of gender gap due to Male/Female differences in Risk preferences 
  
             (1) 
Female coefficient 
           (2) 
Male coefficient 
              (3) 
Pooled coefficient 
Entrepreneurial choice 
 Coefficient 0.0004 0.0024 0.0018 
 Difference 0.0202 0.0202 0.02022 
 Percentage 1.9% 11.8% 8.8% 
Log Earnings     
Self-employed Coefficient -0.0022 -0.0835 -0.0120 
 Difference 0.4366 0.4366 0.4366 
 Percentage -0.5% -19.1% -2.7% 
Paid-employed Coefficient 0.0028 -0.0052 0.0021 
 Difference 0.3121 0.3121 0.3121 
 Percentage 0.9% -1.7% 0.7% 
Log hours worked     
Self-employed Coefficient -0.0012 -0.0130 0.0031 
 Difference 0.4162 0.4162 0.4162 
 Percentage -0.3% -3.1% 0.8% 
Paid-employed Coefficient -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0014 
 Difference 0.2037 0.2037 0.2037 
 Percentage -0.1% -0.3% 0.7% 
Note) Difference indicates mean differences in outcomes such as entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and hours of labor. 
Percentage is calculated as (coefficient/difference)*100. 
45 
 
 
Table 8. Robustness of risk preferences in occupational choice 
 Men (four point risk index) Women (four point risk index) 
 Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self 
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Main estimation 
(1994~2002) 
0.024*** 
(3.86) 
-0.024*** 
(3.86) 
1.91e-07 
(0.87) 
0.0016 
(0.17) 
-0.0007 
(0.10) 
-0.0005 
(0.81) 
1993 Control variables 
0.025*** 
(4.13) 
-0.025*** 
(4.13) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(1.08) 
-0.004 
(0.69) 
-0.002 
(1.23) 
1994-1996 
0.012*** 
(3.01) 
-0.012*** 
(2.99) 
-0.000 
(0.11) 
-0.000 
(0.09) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
-0.002 
(0.66) 
1994-1998 
0.017*** 
(3.58) 
-0.017*** 
(3.56) 
-0.000 
(0.54) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
-0.003 
(0.57) 
-0.001 
(0.71) 
1994-2000 
0.020*** 
(3.79) 
-0.020*** 
(3.79) 
-0.000 
 (0.04) 
0.004 
(0.60) 
-0.003 
(0.48) 
-0.001 
(0.74) 
Exclude number of kids, 
presence of young 
children, wealth 
0.028*** 
(4.59) 
-0.028*** 
(4.50) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(1.17) 
-0.006 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(1.62) 
Note: 1) t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 2) ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
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Table 9. Robustness of risk aversion in earnings and labor supply 
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Panel A log hourly earnings     
Main estimate (1994-2002) 
-0.192*** 
(3.54) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.039*** 
(3.20) 
0.020** 
(2.12) 
1993 Control variables 
-0.143** 
(2.42) 
0.033 
(0.54) 
-0.041*** 
(2.67) 
0.020** 
(2.16) 
1994-1996 
-0.103 
(1.26) 
-0.095 
(1.21) 
0.021 
(1.46) 
-0.011 
(0.62) 
1994-1998 
-0.176* 
(1.90) 
-0.103 
(1.03) 
0.021   
(1.07) 
0.007 
(0.30) 
1994-2000 
-0.196 
(1.28) 
-0.100 
(0.73) 
0.036 
(1.36) 
0.048 
(1.52) 
Exclude number of kids, presence of 
young children, wealth  
-0.140*** 
(2.73) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.014 
(1.25) 
0.019** 
(2.01) 
Panel B log hours worked     
Main estimate (1994-2002) 
-0.030 
(1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
1993 Control variables 
-0.056** 
(2.25) 
-0.011 
(0.26) 
-0.005 
(1.19) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
1994-1996 
-0.146* 
(1.76) 
-0.031   
(0.25) 
-0.014 
(1.01) 
-0.018 
(0.90) 
1994-1998 
-0.074 
(0.52) 
0.030 
(0.21) 
-0.019 
(0.94) 
-0.021 
(0.80) 
1994-2000 
0.160 
(0.76) 
-0.160 
(0.88) 
-0.023 
(0.78) 
-0.056* 
(1.68) 
Exclude number of kids, presence of 
young children, wealth  
-0.010 
(0.48) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.002 
(0.27) 
Note: Averaging time-varying characteristics are controlled in the main regression based 9 years of time window. t-
statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.   
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Table 10. Robustness of decomposition of entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and hours worked with 
respect to risk aversion 
  Entrepreneurial choice 
Earnings Hours worked 
   Self-employment 
Paid-
employment 
Self-
employment 
Paid-
employment 
Main estimation:1994-
2002 
Coefficient 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0003 
Difference 0.0202 0.4366 0.3121 0.4162 0.2037 
Percentage 1.9% -0.5% 0.9% -0.3% -0.1% 
1993 Control variables Coefficient 0.0010 0.0152 0.0029  -0.0043 0.0004 
 Difference 0.0259 0.3995 0.3133 0.4035 0.2051 
 Percentage 4.0% 3.4% 0.9% -1.1% 0.2% 
1994-1996 Coefficient 2.09E-05 -0.0428 -0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0073 
 Difference 0.0196 0.6087 0.4190 0.6044 0.3859 
 Percentage 0.1% -7.0% -0.4% -0.8% -1.9% 
1994-1998 Coefficient 0.0005 -0.0376 0.0012 0.0249 -0.0033 
 Difference 0.0239 0.7048 0.5581 0.6890 0.5835 
 Percentage 1.9% -5.3% 0.2% 3.6% -0.6% 
1994-2000 Coefficient 0.0006 -0.0404 0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0088 
 Difference 0.0203 0.9143 0.6958 1.0880 0.6914 
 Percentage 2.9% -4.4% 1.2% -0.7% -1.3% 
Exclude number of kids, 
presence of young 
children, wealth  
Coefficient 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0026   0.0017 -0.0002 
Difference 0.0259 0.4366 0.3121 0.4162 0.2037 
Percentage 4.5% -0.4% 0.8% 0.4% -0.1% 
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Appendix 1. Proofs of  0wµ
θ
∂
<
∂
and 0sµ
θ
∂
>
∂
  
1) Proof of 0wµ
θ
∂
<
∂
 
For simplicity, subscript y  is dropped. 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , )
1 2
s ss
s s s L s s
s
EU e e fθ sθµ µ θ µ s
θ µ
−
  
 = − + − ≡ −   
                 (1) 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , )
1 2
w ww
w w w L w w
w
EU e e fθ sθµ µ θ µ s
θ µ
−
  
 = − + − ≡ −   
               (2) 
Let’s assume that there exists expected return from paid-employment, ˆwµ , that 
keeps an individual i indifferent between self-employment and paid-employment:  
ˆ( ; , ) ( ; , )s ws s w wf fθ µ s θ µ s=                                         (3) 
We are interested in assessing how increases in risk aversion affect the required 
wage in order to choose paid-employment, holding other things constant.  Taking total 
derivative of (3) with respect to θ  and ˆwµ  yields 
ˆ
ˆ
s w w
w
w
f f fd d dθ θ µ
θ θ µ
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
                                         (4) 
ˆ
0
ˆ
s w
w
w
w
f f
d
fd
θ θµ
θ
µ
 ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ ⇔ = <
∂
∂
                                          (5) 
where 
2 2
11ˆ ˆ(1 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2
w
w w
w w w w
w w w w
f e eθ θs sθ θθ µ µ
µ θ µ µ µ
− −
      ∂
   = − − + >   ∂ −         
                         
Numerator of (5) is negative because 
sf
θ
∂
∂
is more negative than 
wf
θ
∂
∂
as shown in 
Figure 1, and denominator of (5) is positive based on the presumption that 0 < θ < 1.  
49 
 
 
Therefore, the equation (5) is negative, which implies that a more risk averse individual 
requires lower wage from paid-employment than their less risk averse counterparts when 
they decide to enter wage work, holding other things fixed.   
 
2) Proof of 0sµ
θ
∂
>
∂
is analogous to 1). 
ˆ
ˆ
s s w
s
s
f f fd d dθ µ θ
θ µ θ
∂ ∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂ ∂
                                          (6) 
ˆ
0
ˆ
w s
s
s
s
f f
d
fd
θ θµ
θ
µ
 ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ ⇔ = >
∂
∂
                                          (7) 
Numerator of (7) is positive because 
sf
θ
∂
∂
is more negative than 
wf
θ
∂
∂
as shown in Figure 
1.
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Appendix 2. The effect of risk aversion on work effort in hours. 
Assume that an individual i chooses j occupation and so selects ej for j=s, w at a 
fixed level of utility ju . 
Let 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , ) (1 )
1 2
j
j j j L j j j j L j
j
e e e g e uθ
sθµ µ θ µ s µ
θ µ
−
  
 − + − ≡ + − =  −         
(1) 
Taking total derivative of (1) with respect with θ  and je  yields 
( ; , ) 0j j j j L j
gg de e d deθ µ s θ µ
θ
∂
+ − =
∂
                                                        
( ; , )
j
j
j j L
gede
d g
θ
θ θ µ s µ
∂
−
∂⇔ =
−
>
<
0                                        (2) 
Numerator of (2) is positive because 0g
θ
∂
<
∂
from Figure 1 and 0je > .  But, 
sign of denominator of (2) is ambiguous depending on the relative sizes of utility from 
market work, ( ; , )j jg θ µ s and utility from nonmarket work, Lµ .  
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Appendix 3. Constant absolute risk aversion 
We specify the utility function as  
𝑈 = 𝑒[1 − exp(−𝜃𝜃)] + (1 − 𝑒)𝜇𝐿 
where y is monetary return from the market work and 𝜇𝐿 is utility from nonmarket work 
or leisure; 𝜃 = 𝜃(𝑋𝑚) and 𝜇𝐿 = 𝜇(𝑋𝑚,𝑋ℎ).  
Taking the MacLaurin series expansion about – 𝜃𝜃 and assuming the 
distribution of y has second moments, the expected utility is approximated as  
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑒 �1 − �1 − 𝜃𝐸(𝜃) + 12𝜃2𝐸(𝜃2)�� + (1 − 𝑒)𝜇𝐿  = 𝑒 �𝜃𝜇𝑦 − 12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦2 + 𝜇𝑦2�� + (1 − 𝑒)𝜇𝐿 
where 𝜇𝑦 is expected earnings from market work and 𝜎𝑦2 is variance of earnings in the 
market.  
 The first order conditions are as given  
𝑒∗ > 0 𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜇𝑦 − 12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦2 + 𝜇𝑦2�� = 𝜇𝐿 
𝑒∗ = 0 𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜇𝑦 − 12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦2 + 𝜇𝑦2�� < 𝜇𝐿 
𝑒∗ = 1 𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜇𝑦 − 12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦2 + 𝜇𝑦2�� > 𝜇𝐿 
                     𝑒∗ = 𝑒(𝜃,𝑋𝑚,𝑋ℎ) 
Assuming e>0, an individual will enter self-employment if  
𝑒𝑠 �𝜃𝜇𝑦𝑠 −
12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦𝑠2 + 𝜇𝑦𝑠2�� + (1 − 𝑒𝑠)𝜇𝐿 > 𝑒𝑤 �𝜃𝜇𝑦𝑤 − 12𝜃2�𝜎𝑦𝑤2 + 𝜇𝑦𝑤2�� + (1 − 𝑒𝑤)𝜇𝐿 
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 𝑒𝑠𝜇𝑦𝑠2 � 𝜃𝜇𝑦𝑠 − 12 𝜃2 � �𝜎𝑦𝑠𝜇𝑦𝑠�2 + 1�� + (1 − 𝑒𝑠)𝜇𝐿 > 𝑒𝑤𝜇𝑦𝑤2 � 𝜃𝜇𝑦𝑤 − 12 𝜃2 � �𝜎𝑦𝑤𝜇𝑦𝑤�2 + 1�� + (1 − 𝑒𝑤)𝜇𝐿 
𝐶𝐶𝑠 > 𝐶𝐶𝑤 implies that the second term in the bracket on the left hand side is 
smaller than that on the right hand side.  This suggests that 𝜇𝑦𝑠 should be higher than 
𝜇𝑦𝑤 to choose self-employment for any given risk aversion, other things equal.  
In addition, as risk aversion increases, the expected utility from market work 
declines faster in self-employment than in paid-employment at a fixed level of work 
effort because 𝐶𝐶𝑠 > 𝐶𝐶𝑤.  Hence, the predictions from CARA are virtually the same as 
those from CRRA.  
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Appendix 4. Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Determinants of Occupational Choice for 
Men and Women (1994~2002): Including those who were self-employed in 1993 
 Men  Women 
 Self-
Employme
nt 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self-
Employme
nt 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Panel A       
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 0.021*** 
(2.95) 
-0.021*** 
(2.91) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.000 
(0.87) 
Education -0.011**   
(2.30) 
0.011** 
(2.09) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
0.000     
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
Age -0.077 
(0.67) 
0.076 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.012 
(0.10) 
-0.007 
(0.06) 
-0.005 
(0.62) 
Age squared 0.001  
(0.61) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.70) 
Work experience 0.006* 
(1.93) 
-0.006 
(1.62) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.005** 
(2.23) 
0.007*** 
(3.11) 
-0.002*** 
(3.82) 
log(net asset) 0.173*** 
(6.69) 
-0.173*** 
(6.70) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.105***   
(4.00) 
-0.111*** 
(4.20) 
0.006***    
(2.69) 
White 0.040* 
(1.82) 
-0.040* 
(1.82) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.037*   
(1.66) 
-0.038* 
(1.68) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
Married, spouse present -0.030 
(0.95) 
0.030 
(0.95) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.040 
(1.58) 
-0.043* 
(1.71) 
0.003* 
(1.78) 
Number of Kids  -0.008   
(0.59) 
0.008 
(0.58) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.015 
(1.20) 
-0.014 
(1.14) 
-0.001 
(0.91) 
Presence of young kids 
(0~6) 
-0.022 
(0.49) 
0.022   
(0.49) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.16) 
-0.016 
(0.43) 
0.010*** 
(2.92) 
Presence of young kids 
(7~12) 
-0.113* 
(1.80) 
0.113* 
(1.80) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.095* 
(1.89) 
0.101** 
(2.00) 
-0.006 
(1.62) 
Health limitation to work 0.102* 
(1.82) 
-0.102*   
(1.64) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.064   
(1.53) 
-0.074* 
(1.75) 
0.009*** 
(2.96) 
Mother’s education 0.005   
(1.30) 
-0.005 
(1.30) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
-0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.000 
(0.55) 
Father’s education 0.001 
(0.45) 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
-0.002 
(0.79) 
0.000* 
(1.76) 
Mother-
professional/proprietor 
-0.016 
(0.34) 
0.016   
(0.34) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.16) 
-0.007 
(0.13) 
-0.002 
(0.43) 
Father-
professional/proprietor 
-0.017 
(0.64) 
0.018 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
0.078**   
(2.41) 
-0.080**    
(2.44) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
Urban -0.023 
(0.83) 
0.023 
(0.80) 
0.000   
(0.01) 
-0.015 
(0.55) 
0.013 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
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Appendix 5. Estimates of log annual earnings across employment type by gender  
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Risk acceptance index(1-4) -0.070 (0.64) 
-0.073 
(0.52) 
-0.105*** 
(6.86) 
0.009 
(0.62) 
Education 
-0.007 
(0.14) 
0.102 
(1.21) 
0.116*** 
(15.99) 
0.097*** 
(10.29) 
Age 
1.716 
(1.21) 
1.307 
(0.64) 
-0.038 
(0.20) 
-0.777*** 
(3.16) 
Age squared 
-0.024 
(1.10) 
-0.022 
(0.69) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.012*** 
(2.98) 
Work experience 
-0.105** 
(2.23) 
0.016 
(0.43) 
0.095***  
(19.08) 
0.106*** 
(12.74) 
White 
0.215 
(0.78) 
-0.494 
(1.11) 
0.062* 
(1.67) 
-0.008 
(0.18) 
Married 
-0.113 
(0.33) 
-0.164 
(0.36) 
0.058 
(1.06) 
-0.106** 
(2.09) 
Number of kids 
-0.020 
(0.12) 
-0.044 
(0.23) 
0.036 
(1.63) 
0.028 
(1.10) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 
0.414 
(0.85) 
-1.097* 
(1.80) 
0.301*** 
(4.24) 
-0.212*** 
(2.58) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 
0.512 
(0.65) 
-0.311 
(0.37) 
0.644*** 
(6.11) 
-0.111 
(1.02) 
Health problem 
-1.362** 
(2.08) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
-2.358*** 
(13.73) 
-0.503*** 
(4.47) 
Mother education 
-0.064 
(1.46) 
-0.024 
(0.40) 
-0.0154*** 
(2.37) 
-0.014* 
(1.74) 
Father education 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.029 
(0.57) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.008 
(1.24) 
Urban 
0.265 
(0.80) 
1.325*** 
(2.57) 
0.126*** 
(2.79) 
0.042 
(0.73) 
Years in business 
0.269*** 
(3.71) 
0.213* 
(1.68) 
- - 
Heckman’s selection 
-10.291** 
(2.36) 
-19.410** 
(2.30) 
10.337*** 
(10.53) 
-0.982  
(1.03) 
R2 0.229 0.261 0.517 0.470 
N 172 103 1642 1510 
Note: Risk attitudes are measured by a categorical variable from the most (1) to the least risk aversion. Four regions are 
controlled in both Panels.  t-statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.   
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Appendix 6. Estimates of labor supply across employment type by gender 
 Self-employment Paid-employment All working 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Risk acceptance index(1-4) -0.030 (1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
Education 0.007 
(0.71) 
-0.029 
(1.22) 
0.005** 
(2.12) 
0.005 
(1.43) 
0.006** 
(2.27) 
-0.003 
(0.69) 
Age 0.274 
(0.93) 
-0.444 
(0.81) 
0.011 
(0.18) 
-0.243** 
(2.48) 
0.023 
(0.35) 
-0.194* 
(1.73) 
Age squared -0.004 
(0.88) 
0.007 
(0.82) 
-0.000 
(0.23) 
0.004** 
(2.49) 
-0.000 
(0.37) 
0.003 
(1.63) 
Work experience 0.009 
(0.98) 
0.028** 
(2.52) 
0.006*** 
(3.59 
0.001  
(0.40) 
0.006*** 
(3.23) 
0.020*** 
(7.69) 
White -0.108* 
(1.99) 
-0.113 
(0.91) 
0.020 
(1.63) 
-0.013 
(0.70) 
0.007 
(0.52) 
-0.069*** 
(3.39) 
Married 0.015 
(0.21) 
-0.182 
(1.45) 
-0.003 
(0.14) 
-0.085*** 
(4.20) 
0.011 
(0.60) 
-0.140*** 
(6.28) 
Number of kids 0.020 
(0.60) 
-0.094* 
(1.67) 
0.011 
(1.47) 
-0.011 
(1.09) 
0.009 
(1.10) 
-0.025** 
(2.08) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 0.157 
(1.55) 
-0.113 
(0.59) 
0.039* 
(1.66) 
-0.045 
(1.34) 
0.049** 
(2.02) 
-0.147*** 
(4.19) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 0.205 
(1.31) 
0.465* 
(1.89) 
0.007 
(0.21) 
-0.073* 
(1.70) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
0.103** 
(2.20) 
Health problem -0.154 
(1.09) 
0.246 
(1.18) 
-0.168*** 
(2.96) 
0.194*** 
(4.23) 
-0.093** 
(2.39) 
0.069 
(1.50) 
Mother education 0.013 
(1.34) 
-0.002 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.003 
(0.90) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
-0.003 
(0.96) 
Father education 0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.46) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
-0.000 
(0.26) 
-0.005* 
(1.74) 
Urban -0.048 
(0.71) 
0.026 
(0.19) 
-0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.040* 
(1.75) 
-0.021 
(1.34) 
-0.019 
(0.73) 
Heckman’s selection -1.396 
(1.46) 
1.514 
(0.53) 
0.199 
(0.62) 
-2.830*** 
(7.12) 
-0.825*** 
(2.75) 
-0.491 
(1.50) 
R2 0.153 0.201 0.059 0.223 0.063 0.175 
N 277 221 1629 1488 1906 1709 
Note: Four regions are controlled. t-statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%.   
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CHAPTER 3. RISK AVERSION OR RISK MANAGEMENT?: HOW MEASURES 
OF RISK AVERSION AFFECT FIRM ENTRY AND FIRM SURVIVAL 
 
1. Introduction 
 Numerous studies have shown that measured risk aversion affects occupational 
and human capital investment decisions.  Less risk averse individuals are more likely to 
pick private sector jobs (Pfeifer, 2008).  Less risk averse individuals are also more likely 
to become entrepreneurs (Van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Hartog et al., 2002; Cramer et al., 
2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Kan and Tsai, 2006; Ahn, 2009).  Similarly, less risk averse 
individuals are more likely to enter occupations and educational investments 
characterized by higher earnings variances (Orazem and Mattila, 1991; Shaw, 1996; 
Bonin et al., 2007; Isphording, 2010).   
A missing element in these empirical analyses of the effects of risk aversion on 
occupational or educational decisions is whether those risk aversion also affect the 
outcomes of those decisions.13  For example, if risk attitudes affect the decision to 
become an entrepreneur, they should also affect the choice of riskiness of the venture at 
the time of decision making.  That is, more risk averse entrepreneurs should select safer 
ventures while less risk averse entrepreneurs should opt for riskier firms.  As a 
consequence, holding constant observable skills, more risk averse entrepreneurs should 
                                            
13 Exceptions include Rauch and Frese (2007) and Caliendo et al. (2010) which will be discussed below. 
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survive more frequently than their less risk averse counterparts.  This chapter shows in 
theory that there is a positive correlation between an individual’s degree of risk aversion 
and the expected return from an entrepreneurial venture at the time of entry and that 
greater risk aversion increases expected duration in business.  Because the expected 
return is the risk neutral equivalent value, higher expected return implies a higher survival 
probability.  From that proposition, we posit a hypothesis that more risk averse 
entrepreneurs have higher survival probability than their less risk averse counterparts.  
We test the hypothesis using successive entry cohorts of young entrepreneurs in the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).  We show that the prediction is 
soundly rejected: the most successful entrepreneurs are the least risk averse.   
This surprising finding calls into question the interpretation of common measures 
of risk aversion such as those used in the NLSY as measures of taste for risk.  Instead, 
these measures perform as if they are indicators of entrepreneurial skill – the least risk 
averse are apparently those who can best assess and manage risks.  Indeed, this 
interpretation ties well with recent experimental evidence presented by Frederick (2005), 
Benjamin et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2009), and Dohmen et al. (2010) who find that the 
least risk averse have superior cognitive ability measured by IQ.  In the NLSY79 sample, 
cognitive ability measured by the score on the AFQT is also significantly positively 
correlated with willingness to accept risk.  It seems that agents with the lowest measured 
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risk aversion have unusually high endowments of unmeasured ability, and it is this human 
capital advantage that leads them to become entrepreneurs, private sector employees, and 
entrants into occupations and education choices with greater earnings variance.  
The next section derives the theorized positive relationship between risk aversion 
and probability of business success conditional on entrepreneurial entry.  Section 3 
presents an empirical methodology that will test the role of measured risk aversion on 
entrepreneurial survival.  Section 4 reviews data.  In the following subsection, the 
relation between business income and failure/closure and the measure of risk aversion are 
discussed.  Empirical results that soundly reject the hypothesized relationship between 
measured risk aversion and entrepreneurial success are presented in section 5.  Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Theory 
 Pratt (1964) defined a risk premium as the difference between the expected return 
and the certainty equivalent return.  The higher required risk premia make it less likely 
that more risk averse agents will choose to become entrepreneurs.  However, the more 
risk averse individuals who nevertheless enter self-employment should invest in ventures 
with greater expected return and less risk compared to entrepreneurs who are less risk 
averse.  This section demonstrates that these predictions follow from a standard 
theoretical model of occupational choice under uncertainty.  
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Agents engage in choosing one of several alternative occupations.  The 
individual’s utility depends on the monetary and hedonic returns to occupational entry, 
U(yj,αj), where yj is the present value of future earnings and αj is a positive or negative 
hedonic return from an occupation j.  The utility function is concave and strictly 
increasing in earnings so that it can reflect an individual’s risk aversion.  Assuming 
additive separability, the utility can be described as  
( )j j jU u y α= +                                                    (1) 
where u is an increasing and strictly concave function in jy , 0>′u  and 0<′′u . 
For simplicity, suppose that there are two occupations, entrepreneurship (e) and 
wage work (w).  We assume that the present value of income from wage work is known 
but that the return from entrepreneurship is uncertain.14  However, the distribution of 
entrepreneurial earnings is assumed to have known mean and variance.15   We also 
assume that the hedonic return from all occupations is known with certainty.   
The expected utility of choosing entrepreneurship can be approximated by the 
second order Taylor series expansion of (1) around mean of earnings, eµ : 
                                            
14 The theory is for a point in time occupational decision subject to expected earnings in the occupation at 
that time. We do not consider occupational reswitching, although any planned reswitching could be 
incorporated into the expected earnings stream at that point in time. 
15 We get similar implications if the returns to wage work are uncertain but have lower variance than 
returns to entrepreneurship, but the derivation is more complicated. Our derivation is consistent with using 
the variance in wage work as a baseline variation. Hamilton (2000) found that the standard deviation of 
earnings from self-employment 2-4 times larger than the standard deviation of earnings from wage work. In 
the NLSY, the coefficient of variation of log hourly earnings from self-employment is 67% to 89% larger 
for self-employment than wage work. 
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An individual will enter the risky occupation e if his expected utility in the risky 
job (e) is greater than that in the safe job (w): e wEU EU> .  The agent is indifferent 
between the two alternatives when eEU = wEU ,
16  
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>
′
′′
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e
e
u
u
µ
µ
γ  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
(ARA).17 
We need to establish how an increase in risk aversion affects the required return in 
the risky job in order to keep an individual indifferent between e and w for any given risk,
es .  The answer depends on the expected return from e at the time individuals are 
choosing an occupation.  Taking the partial derivative of eµ  with respect to γ  in (4) 
yields 
                                            
16 Recall that we have imposed 2 0ws =  and w wyµ = . 
17 Notice that as the known hedonic return from entrepreneurship increases relative to the hedonic return 
from wage work, the required gap in expected income, ( ) ( )e wu u yµ − necessary to leave the individual 
indifferent between e and w gets smaller. This is consistent with Hamilton’s (2000) conclusion that 
entrepreneurs accept lower pay in order to have their own businesses. 
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∂
∂
γ
µe because 0>′u  due to the concavity of u, 0>γ , and 
0)()( >−+− wewe yuu ααµ  from equation (4).
18  The positive sign indicates that as an 
individual becomes more risk averse, he requires a higher expected return from e to be as 
well off in the risky occupation e as in the safe occupation w.  
If risk aversion affects the required expected return from entrepreneurship at the 
time of entry, it should also affect the probability of entrepreneurial survival.  The 
expected return is the risk neutral equivalent present value of entering entrepreneurship, 
and so requiring an even higher expected return implies a higher survival probability.  
To formalize this proposition, let 0iT ≥ denote the duration of the firm’s existence 
so that if an entrepreneur i exits a business ti years after start-up: i iT t= .  Ti has a 
cumulative distribution function, ( ) Pr( )i i iF t T t= ≤ , which is the probability of firm 
failure by time it .  The associated probability density function is ( )if t .  
An entrepreneur decides to shut down his business if the realized present value of 
                                            
18 Alternatively, we could assume relative risk aversion, which generates the same result as ARA does. See 
Appendix1 for the derivation. 
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the monetary and hedonic returns from operating the business is less than the operating 
cost of time which equals the present value of the stream of pecuniary and hedonic 
returns from wage work at it .   
, , , ( )
R
i e t e w t i wy xπ α α+ < +                                              (6) 
The realized return from the entrepreneurial venture at time t ( , ,
R
i e tπ ) is 
decomposed into expected return and unexpected return: 
, , , ,( )
R
i e t e i i e tπ µ γ ξ= +                                                 (7) 
where eµ represents the return expected at the time of start-up which is a function of i’s 
degree of risk aversion and , ,i e tξ denotes a random negative or positive shock to the 
expected stream of returns to entrepreneurship that is realized as of time t.  The random 
shock , ,i e tξ  is drawn from the distribution, , ,( )i e tg ξ .   
The ith entrepreneur will survive in business unless he receives a sufficiently bad 
draw on , ,i e tξ  that the expected present value of pecuniary and hedonic returns to the 
venture fall below the entrepreneur’s opportunity costs of time.  In (6), the opportunity 
costs are represented from the present value of pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns from 
wage work.  That would include , ( )w t iy x which is the present value of anticipated wages 
which are based on i’s human capital and socioeconomic background designated by the 
vector xi; plus the hedonic return from wage work, wα .   
The cumulative distribution function of Ti can be specified by the probability of 
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failure at time ti: 
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
* *
, ,
( ) Pr( )
Pr( ( ) )
Pr( ( ) ( ) )
Pr( ( ) ( ) )
Pr( ) ( )
i i i
R
i e t e w t i w
e i i e t e w t i w
i e t w t i e i w e
i e t i i
F t T t
y x
y x
y x
a G a
π α α
µ γ ξ α α
ξ µ γ α α
ξ
= ≤
= + ≤ +
= + + ≤ +
= ≤ − + −
= ≤ =
                             (8) 
where * , ( ) ( )i w t i e i w ea y x µ γ α α= − + −  denotes the reservation profit level at which the 
entrepreneur is indifferent between shutting down and staying in business; and G is 
cumulative distribution function of , ,i e tξ . 
 The reservation profit is decreasing in risk aversion because of (5), which means 
that more risk averse entrepreneurs have a lower reservation profit: 
*
0i e
i i
a µ
γ γ
∂ ∂
= − <
∂ ∂
.  
Therefore, the probability that more risk averse entrepreneurs stay in business is higher 
than less risk averse entrepreneurs. 
The probability that an entrepreneur exits is given by 
* *( ) ( )
a
iet ig d G aη ξ ξ−∞= =∫                                             (9) 
Assuming the profit shocks , ,i e tξ are iid random expectation errors, the expected 
duration in business before receiving a bad draw is: 
*
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) i ii
S t F t
G aη
= = = −                                         (10) 
where ( )iS t is the probability that the firm survive until time it .   
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Equation (10) indicates that because *( )iG a is decreasing in iγ , the expected 
length of time in business is increasing in iγ .  As a result, conditional on having entered 
entrepreneurship, the most risk averse agents have to have the lowest probability of exit 
because they required the highest expected returns from the venture at the time of entry.   
Our theoretical predictions contrast with a theory advanced in psychology that the 
most successful entrepreneurs have medium levels of risk aversion.  Atkinson and Birch 
(1978) argue that entrepreneurs are motivated by conflicting motivations to achieve 
success and to avoid failure.  In effect, their model assumes utility is the product of 
probability of success, P, and probability of failure, 1-P.  Utility is maximized at P= 0.5 
which they interpret as entrepreneurs with intermediate risk preferences.  Meredith et al. 
(1982) present a similar theory that successful entrepreneurs are moderate risk-takers.  
They argue that entrepreneurs like to challenge themselves with difficult tasks because 
they get satisfaction by accomplishing difficult tasks.  On the other hand, entrepreneurs 
want to avoid disutility from failure.  As a consequence, successful entrepreneurs pick 
projects of intermediate risk that offer reasonable probability of success and at least some 
moderate challenge.  These theories fail to incorporate expected returns into their 
models which lead them to confuse the riskiness of the projects undertaken with the risk 
preferences of the entrepreneurs.  By emphasizing project survival rather than 
anticipated or realized return on investment, they devalue high risk and high reward 
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ventures.  Nevertheless, their prediction that intermediate risk preferences are most 
successful can be tested against the data as we examine our prediction that success is 
highest among the most risk averse.  
3. Empirical methodology 
In order to investigate the extent to which risk aversion affects firm failure, we 
incorporate a hazard regression variant of the exit probability 
* *
, ,( ) Pr( ) ( )i i e t i iF t a G aξ= ≤ =  in (8).  The hazard rate at which spells are completed at 
duration it  conditional on surviving up to it  is defined as 
( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) ( )
i i
i
i i
f t f th t
F t S t
= =
−
 ,                                           (11) 
where ( )iS t , ( )if t , and ( )iF t  are as defined in equation (10).  Assuming the survival 
time it  has a Weibull distribution, the hazard function and survival function at time it  
for individual i are given by 
* * 1( , , | , ) exp( ) pi i i i i ih t a a ptβ δ γ β δγ
−= +                                 (12) 
* *( , , | , ) exp{ exp( ) }pi i i i i iS t a a tβ δ γ β δγ= − +                              (13) 
where p is an ancillary shape parameter to be estimated from the data, iγ is an ordered 
categorical variable indicating attitudes toward risk with higher levels representing 
greater acceptance of risk, and *ia  is composed of human capital and other 
socioeconomic variables that set the entrepreneur’s pecuniary ( , ( )w t iy x ) and 
nonpecuniary ( eα and wα ) costs of time.  We include education, previous labor market 
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experience, age, and parental self-employment/management experience in the xi.  For 
our measures of the relative hedonic returns from self-employment and wage work, eα
and wα , we include marital status and number of children.  Such family variables may 
affect the relative enjoyment in the two occupations.  Additional controls include 
regional and industry dummies to account for sectoral and regional macroeconomic 
conditions.  Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our 
econometric analysis are presented in Table 1.  
The sign on δ reveals whether decreasing levels of risk aversion (i.e., increasing 
levels of willingness to take risk) increase the hazard of firm failure, consistent with the 
theoretical requirement that more risk averse entrepreneurs must have higher expected 
returns from selecting e at the time of entry.  This test implicitly assumes that 
expectation errors are not systematic, meaning that entrepreneurs’ forecasts are rationale 
given information at the time of entry.  Then, taking expectations across multiple entry 
cohorts, expected and realized returns to entrepreneurship converge to the same mean 
value. 
 Although we control for entrepreneurs’ observed characteristics, there may be 
unobserved factors that affect the entrepreneurial survival or failure in addition to the 
observed regressors.  Hence, a frailty model is used to account for the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals.  Because frailty (λ ) is not directly 
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estimated from the data, we assume that it has unit mean and finite variance (θ ) where θ  
is estimated from the data.  Assuming λ  is drawn from an inverse Gaussian 
distribution, the survival function conditional on the frailty is defined as   
0
1/2
( , , , | ) { ( , , ) ( )
1exp (1 [1 2 ln{ ( , , )}] )
i i
i
S t S t g d
S t
λ
θ β δ θ λ β δ λ λ
θ β δ
θ
∞
=
 = − − 
 
∫
                      (14)
 
where )(λg  is probability density function of λ  and the subscript θ  indicates the  
dependence of iS( t )  on θ .
19  
The log-likelihood function can be written as 
*
1
( , , | , ) { ln ( , , , ) (1 ) ln ( , , , )}
n
i i i i i i
i
L a d f t d S tθ θβ δ θ γ β δ θ β δ θ
=
= + −∑           (15) 
where d  is a binary indicator defined such that 1=d  if the entrepreneur exited from 
his business and 0 otherwise; ( , , , ) ( , , , )i i
df t S t
dtθ θ
β δ θ β δ θ= −  is probability density 
function of survival duration t.  
 In order to construct the log-likelihood function in (15), we need to define 
business survival and failure.  We require a common window of time over which to 
judge a venture’s survival.  Two-thirds of U.S. firms close within 6 years of entry, and so 
firms that survive at least 6 years have performed well above average (Dunne et al., 1988; 
                                            
19 Exploiting the relationship between cumulative hazard function and survival function, the survival 
function conditional on the frailty is given as follows: 
0
( )
( | ) exp{ ( | ) } exp{ } { ( )}
( )
t f u
S t h u du du S t
S u
λλ λ λ= − = − =∫ ∫  
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Knaup and Piazza, 2007).20  In this vein, we define entrepreneurial survival as remaining 
in business at least 6 years after startup and business failure as closing the business within 
the first 6 years.   
If we select an inappropriate baseline hazard function, unreliable estimates can 
result (Heckman and Singer, 1984).  As an alternative, we use a semiparametric Cox 
proportional hazard model which requires no assumption about the baseline hazard 
function in order to examine the robustness of our findings to alternative assumptions 
about the error process.  
4. Data 
The data for the analysis is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79).  The NLSY79 includes 12,686 individuals who were 14-22 years old 
in the initial survey year.  Our first step is to create successive cohorts by entry year.  
The first year the respondent reported self-employment is assumed to be their startup year.  
We pick a sample of first-time entrepreneurs who entered business in the same year.  
Hence, those who started their business in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2002 are collected 
for each entry cohort.21  By analyzing entrepreneurial survival from startup, we avoid 
                                            
20 Dunne et al. (1988) found that 62% of manufacturing firms exited within five years following startup. 
Knaup and Piazza’s (2007) examination of the 1998 cohort of new firm entrants found that about two-thirds 
of firms exited by the sixth year in each of the 10 industries examined.   
21 The NLSY79 conducted survey annually from 1979 through 1994 and biennially thereafter. Due to the 
biennial survey over the period we are interested in, we assume that the startup is in an even year.  
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left-censored entrepreneurial spells that have already selected out the most prone to 
failure.  Setting a common starting point also insures that all ventures in the cohort are 
subject to the same macroeconomic environment.  The exit year is measured as the 
middle year between the last reported self-employment year and the year of new 
employment status.  For example, if the respondent reported self-employment in 1994 
but paid-employment in 1996, then we use 1995 as the self-employment exit year.  
Those who remain self-employed as of the wave of the survey conducted 6 years after 
entry are treated as survivors.  All others in the cohort are treated as failures.   
We can stack these 6 cohorts into a series of overlapping sample windows of 6 
years each.  Figure 1 shows cohorts differentiated by entry years and their related six 
year window with individual cases labeled as success or failure.  Dummy variables for 
year of entry control for the common macroeconomic environment shaping the 
expectations of each entry cohort.   
Focusing on our entrepreneurship entry cohorts between 1992 and 2002, our 
sample of self-employed individuals will be initiating their ventures between ages 27 and 
37, and deciding to continue the venture or shut down between the ages of 28 and 45.  
The self-employed are identified by using the “class of worker” category in the NLSY79.  
We consider respondents to be self-employed if at least one job is reported as self-
employment among five possible jobs listed.  Unfortunately, not all the respondents 
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were interviewed in each survey year.  For the missing case of “class of worker” we 
tracked down their employment status by looking at job tenures before and after the 
missing year.  For instance, if a respondent’s job tenures on self-employment increased 
by four years over two consecutive surveys (i.e., 1994, 1998), we consider him as self-
employed in the year when he was not interviewed (i.e., 1996).  When multiple spells of 
entry and exit are reported, only the first entry and exit are included.  We drop 
entrepreneurs from the sample if they enrolled in school at the time of startup.  We also 
drop individuals with incomplete information on individual attributes at the time of start-
up as we need to keep our vector of covariate controls exogenous to the progress of the 
business over the next six years.  The final sample includes 588 entrepreneurs.  
The survival and exit rates by entry cohort are summarized in Table 2.  Average 
exit rate varies from 49% to 71% across entry cohorts.  The 2000 entry cohort has the 
lowest exit rate while the 1992 entry cohort has the highest exit rate.  Overall, 59 % of 
the self-employed exited their business within six years of startup, close to the 65% exit 
rate reported in national analyses of firm survival.   
4.1. Relation between income and failure/closure 
 It is possible that the closure of a business is not due to business failure or 
bankruptcy but to the sale of a profitable business.  While our business exit rate 
corresponds well to the stylized facts regarding business exits, it is useful to examine the 
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income distribution of our entrepreneurs prior to business closure to insure that exits are 
due mainly to failure and not to sales of viable enterprises.  Business income after 
expenses (i.e., profit) in the past calendar year was self-reported during each round of the 
NLSY79.  Our measure of entrepreneurial income prior to business exit is net business 
income reported in the most recently reported wave of the NLSY79 prior to the 
exit/closure of the business.  We can compare that to the distribution of net business 
income reported by the firms in the same cohort that survived at least 6 years.  Figure 2 
shows the net profit distribution for both groups.  The surviving group net business 
income distribution lies well to the right with fatter tails than the distribution for those 
who exited before 6 years elapsed.  Appendix 2 provides more precise statistical 
summary of net profit distribution for both groups.  Seventy-two percent of the exiting 
entrepreneurs reported zero profit shortly before business closure.22  The percentage 
rises to 95% at the time of exit.  On the other hand, only 22% of surviving entrepreneurs 
reported zero profit after 5 years from entry.  The median profit is $11,384 for surviving 
firms after five years and zero for exiting firms.  Therefore, exits in this sample seem 
driven by true failure compared to surviving firms. 
4.2. Measures of risk aversion 
 Risk aversion in the NLSY is elicited using questions closely related to the 
                                            
22 Zero profit was recorded for those who answered ‘no’ to the question of any business income earned. 
Hence, zero profit might infer negative profit for some cases.    
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simple occupational choice model presented in section 2.  Respondents are presented a 
series of hypothetical occupations with different expected lifetime income levels and 
variances.  The individual is asked to choose between a ‘safe’ job paying a fixed income 
and a second ‘risky’ job that will double the ‘safe’ income with 50% probability or else 
pay only a fraction of the ‘safe’ income with 50% probability.  The degree of risk 
aversion is measured by the degree to which the respondent is willing to accept downside 
risk, measured by the amount that pay could be reduced in the ‘risky’ job relative to the 
‘safe’ job.  The lifetime income gamble questions are as follows: 
 
(Q1) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your 
(family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you 
take the new job? 
 
The individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked: (Q2) suppose the chances 
were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. 
Would you still take the new job? Those who answered ‘no’ to the first question (Q1) then asked: 
(Q3) suppose the changes were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it 
would cut it by 20 percent. Would you take the new job? 
 
The risk questions are asked in 1993, 2002, 2004, and 2006 in the NLSY79.  
Because the 2002 entry cohort is the last one considered based on the window of 6 years, 
we employ the risk aversion measured in 1993 in order to avoid having measures of risk 
aversion that follow the business entry decision and reflect the success or failure of the 
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enterprise.23 
Based on their responses to these questions in the 1993 wave of the NLSY, we 
place our entrepreneurs into one of four risk aversion categories ranging from the most 
risk averse (category1) to the least risk averse (category4).  The risk aversion categories 
are constructed as follows: 
1
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The distribution of the measured risk aversion for our entrepreneurial entry 
cohorts is presented in Table 3.  Overall, 40% of the entrepreneurs fall into the most risk 
averse category and 28 % fall into the least risk averse group.  There is no apparent 
systematic pattern to the distribution of the measured risk aversion across cohorts, with 
the 2002 and 1992 cohorts having similar variation in risk attitudes.  These distributions 
indicate that there is considerable variation in measured risk attitudes in all the entry 
cohorts included in our sample.   
5. Estimation results 
 The results of the failure hazard models applied to the 6 stacked entry cohorts of 
young entrepreneurs in the NLSY79 are reported in Table 4 Panel A.  For robustness, we 
                                            
23 We focus on how risk aversion measured before occupational choice affects the present value of 
expected return from entrepreneurship at the time of entry and expected duration in business.  
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show various specifications implying different assumptions about the nature of the error 
terms and individual unobserved heterogeneity.  The estimate of θ  is statistically 
different from zero and a likelihood ratio test for the presence of heterogeneity is 
statistically significant, which confirms the existence of unobserved individual traits that 
affect probability of business failure.  The estimated shape parameter p is greater than 1 
and statistically significant, which means that the hazard of failure increases with time.  
The significant estimates of θ and p suggest that the Cox model is misspecified.  We will 
therefore focus our discussion on the frailty model results, although none of our 
qualitative conclusions is sensitive to the specification choice.    
We report our results in terms of implied hazard ratio: i.e. the proportional shift in 
the failure hazard function due to one unit change of the covariate, holding fixed all other 
factors including the unobserved frailty.  The control measures perform as in earlier 
studies of firm longevity.  In line with Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Cressy (1996) and 
Taylor (1999), entrepreneur’s age has a significant effect on the hazard of failure.  The 
probability of business failure is quadratic in age, decreasing initially and then increasing 
past a certain age (i.e., 37 in our data).  Previous labor market work experience plays an 
important role in lowering the hazard of firm failure, consistent with Taylor’s (1999) 
analysis.  An additional year of previous experience cuts the hazard of failure by 10%.  
Education (in years of schooling) has no significant impact on firm hazard rate.  This 
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suggests that academic success is a poor indicator of entrepreneurial ability (Taylor, 1999).  
Apparently, practical intelligence acquired from work experience is more important 
(Sternberg, 2004).  Finally, our results show that gender, race, and marital status have 
little effect on hazard rate.  Having self-employed parents also does not have a 
significant impact on business failure although it is found to increase probability of 
becoming self-employed in the previous literature (e.g., Lentz and Laband, 1990; Dunn 
and Holtz-Eakin, 2000). 
Turning to our main concern, the first column reports the effect of risk attitudes on 
firm exits when risk is the only regressor.  Recall that the risk index goes from most (1) 
to least (4) risk averse.  We have the unexpected result that as the entrepreneur becomes 
less risk averse, as measured by standard measures of risk aversion, the likelihood of 
failure decreases.  This is the exact opposite of the predicted relationship between risk 
aversion and firm survival.   
It is possible that the unexpected result is attributable to a correlation between risk 
attitudes and individual human capital and demographic variables that are known at the 
start of the entrepreneurial spell.  However, when we add these measures in Column 2 
the impact of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial hazard of failure is almost identical to that 
in the first column.  The next column adds controls for industry.  Technically these 
measures are endogenous as the entrepreneur picks the sector at the time of entry, and so 
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these sectoral dummies should be excluded.  Nevertheless, they are commonly found to 
affect firm survival (Taylor, 1999) due to sector specific shocks that may differentially 
affect profitability for firms in the same cohort.  The most risk averse are still the most 
likely to fail with a similar hazard ratio, although the estimate loses precision.  
Overall, the results from the four specifications suggest that less risk aversion 
results in a lower hazard and therefore a longer survival time.  More precisely, a unit 
increase in risk acceptance index is associated with a 14% decrease in the hazard of 
failure.  As a result, we soundly reject the hypothesis that more risk aversion increases 
the probability of entrepreneurial survival.  Our finding is also inconsistent with the 
psychological models that argue the most successful entrepreneurs have moderate risk 
aversion.  In order to check the psychological argument, we test for the intermediate risk 
attitudes against the most and the least risk using risk attitudes dummies.  To do so, we 
generate three risk attitude dummies: willingness to take low, medium, and high risk.  
We use willingness to take low risk as base category.  As shown in Panel B of Table 4, 
we do not observe the predicted nonlinear relationship between risk aversion and hazard 
of firm failure.24  Instead, the hazard ratio drops progressively as willingness to take risk 
increases.  Indeed, the most successful entrepreneurs are the least risk averse as before.  
Our findings differ from the few previous studies relating risk aversion and 
                                            
24 The results are not sensitive to different classification of risk dummy variables. See the Appendix 3 for 
the estimation results.  
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entrepreneurial success.  The meta analysis of past studies of risk aversion and 
entrepreneurial success by Rauch and Frese (2007) reported a positive but relatively small 
correlation.  Hence, they conclude that risk attitudes have little effect on entrepreneurial 
success.  However, differences in risk and success measures across studies make it hard 
to generalize findings.  A more recent study by Caliendo et al. (2010) reported a U-
shaped relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial failure which they offered 
as support for the psychological theories.25  One difficulty with their study is the reliance 
on nonstandard measures of risk aversion that do not fit the required context of selecting 
risky occupations.26  A further problem is that risk attitudes were measured after startup 
for most respondents and so their measure of risk attitudes may reflect business success or 
failure.  However, the most important problem common to past studies is the failure to 
focus on the decisions of an entry cohort but rather on business survival of entrepreneurs 
who have already managed to survive many years prior to the survey.  The longer a firm 
survives, the more likely it will continue to survive (Knaup and Piazza, 2007), and so the 
risk attitudes of entrepreneurs that already failed before the survey are not incorporated 
                                            
25 It is likely that Caliendo et al. (2010) misinterpret the psychological theory of achievement motivation as 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk-taking propensity and survival. That higher achievement is 
positively related to propensity to take an intermediate risk does not necessarily mean an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between risk attitudes and achievement. In their theoretical model, Caliendo et al. (2010) 
assume that less risk aversion is associated with higher expected payoff in the case of success, which yields 
the odd implication that the most risk averse picks projects with the lowest return conditional on success, 
regardless of variance. In addition, they did not model utility explicitly.  
26 Two sets of questions are used to measure respondent’s risk aversion. One set of questions asks 
respondents if they are risk averse. The other asks respondents how they would invest lottery winnings, a 
context that could elicit very different risk preferences than one where they are allocating earned income, 
and one that confuses risk preferences with portfolio allocation.  
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into the analysis.  That selection problem biases any interpretation of the relationship 
between risk aversion and firm survival. 
5.1. Sensitivity analysis 
 We first test sensitivity of the results with respect to the time windows over 
which business survival and failure are defined.  The estimation results are summarized 
in Table 5 Panel A.  For brevity, we report only the estimates of risk attitudes in the four 
specifications.  The baseline estimation results are redisplayed in the first row of Table 5 
for reference.  The second row represents the results when we define the survival as 
remaining in business at least 4 years after startup.  The third row is the case when we 
consider firm survival as remaining in business at least 8 years after entry.  The 
regression results remain stable in all the specifications.  The negative relationship 
between risk attitudes and hazard of failure holds for both the windows of 4 and 8 years 
although the estimates based on 4 years become insignificant. 
One concern we raise with past studies is the use of measures of risk aversion that 
are taken after the respondent has already been in business.  We illustrate the potential 
bias of using endogenous risk preference measures in Panel B of Table 5.  We re-
estimate the hazard regression with risk attitudes measured in 2002, 2004, and 2006.  
While the coefficient is still negative, the estimate is never statistically significant.  It 
appears that the bias from using risk aversion elicited after startup is to lessen evidence 
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that the most risk averse are the least successful. 
Because our own results rely on the NLSY’s 1993 elicitation of risk attitudes, it is 
possible that we should have excluded the 1992 entrepreneurship cohort.  Our findings 
above suggest that inclusion of the 1992 cohort may have biased our results.  We refit 
the hazard regression without the 1992 entry cohort.  The results are summarized in 
Table 5 Panel C.  In all cases, the finding that the most risk averse are most likely to fail 
strengthens compared to the estimates in the first row of Table 5, consistent with our 
assessment that endogenously elicited risk aversion bias the estimates toward zero.   
Lastly, rather than using entry cohorts, we use a sample of surviving entrepreneurs 
as of 2002, a sample comparable to the type used in previous studies.  Such samples 
should be biased by the exclusion of the least successful entrepreneurs.  We add a 
control for firm tenure along with the other individual characteristics used before.  As 
shown in Panel D of Table 5, all coefficients on risk attitudes are now positive and 
insignificant, consistent with the theoretical effect of risk aversion of entrepreneurial 
success.  Selection bias from inappropriately excluding unsuccessful entrepreneurs 
appears to bias upward coefficients on risk attitudes.  
Our conclusion that entrepreneurs with the lowest measured risk aversion are the 
most successful holds up well.  When researchers use selected samples or endogenous 
measures of risk aversion, these findings are compromised.  We believe our results are 
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more reliable than past studies because of our use of risk attitudes elicited before startup 
and our inclusion of all members of each entrepreneurial entry cohort in the analysis.   
5.2. Risk aversion or Risk management? 
 Our surprising finding that the most risk averse entrepreneurs are the most likely 
to fail calls into question the interpretation of common measures of risk aversion such as 
those used in the NLSY as measures of attitudes toward risk.  Our measured risk 
attitudes perform as if they are indicators of entrepreneurial ability: utilizing information 
and making intelligent decision under uncertainty.  In other words, the less risk averse 
are apparently those who are better able to assess and manage risks. 
Although previous studies have found that greater willingness to take risk 
increases probability of entrepreneurship, it is likely that the least risk averse agents may 
have unusually high endowments of entrepreneurial talent and it is this human capital 
advantage that leads them to become entrepreneurs.  Indeed, this interpretation is 
consistent with the recent evidence presented by experimental studies that find that the 
least risk averse are those who have superior cognitive ability.  These experimental 
studies elicited risk aversion using choices between a lottery and a safe payment.  
Frederick (2005) investigates how cognitive ability is related to risk attitudes 
using U.S. undergraduate students.  To do so, he developed intelligence test called 
“Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)” that measures respondents’ cognitive ability.  He 
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finds that individuals in the high CRT-score group are less risk averse than those in the 
low CRT-score group.  He states that, “the relation is sometimes so strong that the 
preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability (p.26).”  
Similarly, Benjamin et al. (2006) investigate whether variation in risk attitudes is related 
to variation in cognitive ability measured by Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT).  They 
find that students with higher SAT score in Chilean high school show greater willingness 
to take risk.  They suggest that measured risk attitudes may not fully reflect tastes for 
risk due to cognitive limitations.  
More recently, Dohmen et al. (2010) assess the relation between risk attitudes 
and cognitive ability using representative German data.  They discover that less risk 
averse individuals are those who have higher cognitive ability as measured by tests of 
word fluency and symbolic logic.  They concluded that cognitive ability conveys 
information about risk aversion.   
 There is modest support for a link between risk acceptance and cognitive ability 
in the NLSY sample.  The Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), a widely-used proxy 
for measures of ability, was administered to all individuals in the NLSY79.  The 
correlation between measured risk acceptance and the AFQT score is 0.04 for those who 
were self-employed in 1993 and 0.03 for those who ever had start-ups between 1992 and 
2002.  In contrast, the correlation between AFQT score and risk acceptance is negative 
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in the population of wage workers. 
 As a simple test of the comparative static relationship between cognitive ability 
and risk acceptance, we regress measured risk attitudes on AFQT score, controlling for 
the other individual characteristics we included as measures of opportunity cost of time.  
Because of the possible nonlinear measures of risk attitude index, we also incorporate 
ordered probit model.  The regression results are reported in Panel A of Appendix 4.  In 
both models, AFQT score has a statistically significant and positive effect on risk 
acceptance index.  We also report marginal and discrete changes in probabilities for each 
outcome of risk attitudes in Panel B of Appendix 4.  The probability change is associated 
with a standard deviation increase in the corresponding independent variable centered on 
the mean.  The effect of AFQT score is small: a one standard deviation increase in 
AFQT score increases the probability of being in the most risk accepting category by just 
1.4 percentage points.  Nevertheless, it is much larger than the statistically insignificant 
0.4 percentage point increase in probability of being in the same category from an 
additional year of schooling.  The implied existence of an unlearned or nascent 
entrepreneurial skill separate from learned skills is similar to the λ in Lazear’s (2005) 
‘jack-of-all-trades’ model of entrepreneurship.  Along with the experimental evidence of 
a positive correlation between measured risk acceptance and cognitive ability suggest that 
measures of risk attitudes are in fact measures of entrepreneurial ability or the ability to 
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manage risk.  The more confidence agents have in their own ability, the greater 
confidence they will have in their decisions under uncertainty and so greater willingness 
to take risks.   
6. Conclusion 
 This chapter presents a standard theoretical model of occupational choice under 
uncertainty in order to explain more risk averse agent requires higher expected return at 
the time of entry into entrepreneurship.  Because the expected return is the value 
adjusted by risk aversion, higher expected return implies a higher survival probability.  
From that proposition, we hypothesize that more risk averse entrepreneurs have a higher 
probability of survival than their less risk averse counterparts.  This chapter empirically 
tests the hypothesis applying a frailty hazard model to successive entry cohorts of young 
entrepreneurs in the NLSY79.  Success is judged as surviving at least 6 years which puts 
the venture in the upper third of the tenure of start-ups.  
Surprisingly, the empirical tests soundly refute the hypothesis.  We find that the 
most successful entrepreneurs are the least risk averse.  This finding also holds true 
when controlling for individual human capital and demographic variables.  Furthermore, 
the unexpected result is not sensitive to different time windows over which to judge a 
venture’s success.  When incorporating risk aversion dummies in our regression, we still 
observe a monotonically negative relationship between risk acceptance and 
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entrepreneurial failure.  Consequently, our conclusion that the most successful 
entrepreneurs are the least risk averse holds up well.  This finding suggests that 
commonly used measures of risk aversion are not indicators of taste toward risk.  Instead, 
measured risk aversion signals weak entrepreneurial ability, consistent with recent 
experimental evidence linking cognitive ability with a greater willingness to accept risk.  
There is also modest support for a link between measured risk attitudes and cognitive 
ability in the NLSY 79 sample.  
This current study suggests an alternative interpretation; individuals with the 
lowest measured risk aversion have unusually high endowments of unmeasured ability, 
and it is this human capital advantage that leads them to become entrepreneurs, private 
sector employees, and entrants into occupations and education choices with greater 
earnings variance.  
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Table 1. Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
 Definition Mean (Std.) Min Max 
Risk acceptance index (1-4) 
Willingness to take risk: the risk index 1 
indicates the most risk averse and 4 means 
the least risk averse 
2.35 (1.26) 1 4 
Education Years of schooling completed 12.82 (2.40) 1 20 
Work experience 
Years of previous labor market employment 
experience before self-employment 
13.59 (5.33) 0.35 24.58 
Age Age in years 35.90 (3.75) 27 45 
Married, spouse present =1 if married and spouse present 0.57 (0.49) 0 1 
Number of kids 
Number of bio/step/adopted children in 
household 
1.34 (1.31) 0 6 
Male =1 if male 0.51 (0.50) 0 1 
White =1 if white 0.72 (0.45) 0 1 
F-proprietor/manager =1 if father was/is a proprietor or manager 0.10 (0.30) 0 1 
M-proprietor/manager =1 if mother was/is a proprietor or manager 0.02 (0.15) 0 1 
Urban =1 if reside in urban area 0.73 (0.44) 0 1 
Northeast =1 if reside in northeast 0.14 (0.35) 0 1 
North central =1 if reside in north central 0.23 (0.42) 0 1 
South =1 if reside in south 0.41 (0.49) 0 1 
West =1 if reside in west 0.22 (0.41) 0 1 
Indus1 =1 if Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 0.063 (0.24)     0 1 
Indus2 =1 if Construction 0.14 (0.34) 0 1 
Indus3 =1 if Manufacturing 0.03 (0.16) 0 1 
Indus4 =1 if Wholesale trade, Retail trade  0.16 (0.37) 0 1 
Indus5 
=1 if Transportation, Communication, 
Public Utilities 
0.05 (0.21) 0 1 
Indus6 =1 if Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.03 (0.17) 0 1 
Indus7 =1 if Business and Repair Services 0.16 (0.37) 0 1 
Indus8 =1 if Personal Services 0.23 (0.42) 0 1 
Indus9 =1 if Entertainment and Recreation Services 0.03 (0.17) 0 1 
Indus10 =1 if Professional and related services 0.10 (0.30) 0 1 
Indus11 =1 if Public administration 0.003 (0.06) 0 1 
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Table 2. Six year survival and exit rates by entry cohort (NLSY79) 
 
1992 
Age 27-35 
1994 
Age 29-37 
1996 
Age 31-39 
1998 
Age 33-41 
2000 
Age 35-43 
2002 
Age 37-45 
Total 
Survived 
16  
(29%) 
31  
(31%) 
63  
(43%) 
44  
(42%) 
34  
(51%) 
56  
(47%) 
243  
(41%) 
exited 
39 
 (71%) 
69  
(69%) 
84  
(57%) 
60  
(58%) 
33  
(49%) 
63  
(53%) 
345  
(59%) 
Total 
55  
(100%) 
100  
(100%) 
147  
(100%) 
104  
(100%) 
67  
(100%) 
119  
(100%) 
588  
(100%) 
Note: Number of observations is reported with percentage in parenthesis. Survival is measured based on 6 
year longevity in business. 
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Table 3. Distribution of risk aversion by entry cohort (%) NLSY79 
Risk acceptance index 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 overall 
1: Most risk averse 43 % 52 % 35 % 34 % 39 % 43 % 40 % 
2 17 % 9 % 12 % 14 % 7 % 11 % 11 % 
3 7 % 13 % 24 % 22 % 24 % 25 % 21 % 
4: Least risk averse 33 % 26 % 29 % 30 % 30 % 21 % 28 % 
Total Obs. 54 99 147 103 67 118 588 
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Table 4. Regressions explaining probability of failure from frailty hazard and Cox proportional 
model  
 (1) Frailty Hazard 
(2)  
Frailty Hazard 
(3) 
Cox proportional  
(4) 
Frailty Hazard 
Panel A     
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 0.851 (-2.35)b 0.863 (-2.08)b 0.929 (-1.66)c 0.875 (-1.88)c 
Previous Labor market experience 
(in years) 
 
0.919(-3.99)a 0.958 (-3.33)a 0.921 (-3.84)a 
Education  1.178 (0.75) 1.112 (0.72) 1.161 (0.68) 
Education squared  0.996 (-0.53) 0.997 (-0.58) 0.996 (-0.53) 
Male  0.730 (-1.53) 0.824 (-1.51) 0.902 (-0.43) 
Married, spouse present  1.067 (0.31) 1.032 (0.24) 1.010 (0.05) 
Number of Kids   0.930 (-0.94) 0.959 (-0.86) 0.929 (-0.94) 
White  1.234 (0.97) 1.092 (0.66) 1.213 (0.89) 
Age  0.380 (-2.31)b 0.629 (-1.81)c 0.381 (-2.31)b 
Age squared  1.013 (2.26)b 1.0066 (1.76)c 1.013 (2.25)b 
Urban  1.267 (1.11) 1.121 (0.86) 1.234 (0.98) 
Father-proprietor  0.806 (-0.70) 0.915 (-0.46) 0.815 (-0.66) 
Mother-proprietor  0.546 (-0.96) 0.700 (-0.85) 0.548 (-0.95) 
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 region dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes 
θ  (frailty variance) 5.221 [1.936]a 5.578[2.344]b  5.468 [2.300]a 
p (ancillary parameter) 1.818 [0.134]a 1.878 [0.147]a  1.881 [0.147]a 
Log likelihood -723.2 -704.98 -2099.47 -702.04 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 𝜒2(6)=31.55a 𝜒2(22)=72.49a 𝜒2(22)=48.93a 𝜒2(33)=78.64a 
LR test for 0=θ    𝜒2���(1)=45.1a 𝜒2���(1)=38.6a  𝜒2���(1)=38.55a 
Panel B     
Willingness to take medium risk 0.71 (-1.48) 0.75 (-1.23) 0.86 (-1.03) 0.79 (-1.00) 
Willingness to take high risk 0.62 (-2.30)b 0.65 (-2.01)b 0.81 (-1.57) 0.67 (-1.89)c 
Note: Hazard ratios are exponentiated coefficients. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors 
are in brackets. a/b/c significance level at 1%/5%/10%. The null distribution of the LR test statistic is a 50:50 
mixture of a χ2 with zero degree of freedom and a χ2 with one degree of freedom, denoted as 2χ (1).  
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Table 5. Sensitivity of risk attitudes: Negative relationship between risk attitudes and 
hazard 
Risk acceptance index (1) Frailty hazard 
(2) 
Frailty 
hazard 
(3) 
Cox 
proportional 
(4) 
Frailty 
hazard 
Sample 
size 
Panel A      
Main estimation: 
6 year period 
0.851 
(-2.35)b 
0.863 
(-2.08)b 
0.929 
(-1.66)c 
0.875 
(-1.88)c 588 
4 year period 0.919 (-1.20) 
0.924 
(-1.09) 
0.965 
(-0.82) 
0.930 
(-1.01) 679 
8 year period 0.849 (-2.33)b 
0.859 
(-2.09)b 
0.926 
(-1.66)c 
0.864 
(-1.97)b 470 
Panel B      
2002 risk attitudes 0.988  (-0.17) 
0.954  
(-0.64) 
0.977  
(-0.52) 
0.963  
(-0.51) 568 
2004 risk attitudes 0.990  (-0.14) 
0.995  
(-0.06) 
0.100  
(-0.01) 
0.987  
(-0.17) 551 
2006 risk attitudes 1.006  (0.09) 
0.970  
(-0.41) 
0.982  
(-0.38) 
0.975  
(-0.34) 574 
Panel C      
Omitting 1992 cohort 
with 1993 risk attitudes 
0.825  
(-2.53)b 
0.812  
(-2.61)a 
0.901 
(-2.18)b 
0.825  
(-2.40)b 534 
Panel D      
Self-employed in 2002 
With 1993 risk attitudes 
1.000 
(0.01) 
1.011 
(0.15) 
1.011   
(0.24) 
1.007 
(0.10) 639 
Note: Top number is the estimated hazard ratio for the risk attitude index where firm success is measured 
under alternative time windows. The Risk index varies from 1: most risk averse to 4: least risk averse. 
Columns correspond to the specifications used in the corresponding columns in Table 4. t- statistics 
reported in parenthesis. a/b/c significance level at 1%/5%/10%. 
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 Figure 1. Successive entry cohorts overlapped based on windows of 6 years 
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Figure 2-A. Profit for those who exited business within 6 years after startups 
 
 
 
Figure 2-B. Profit for those who survived in business at least 6 years  
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Appendix 1 
An agent is indifferent between the risky job and the safe job when eEU = , 
or 
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where  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
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Appendix 2. Statistical summary of net profit  
 Zero profit 
(frequency) 
Mean ($) Median 
($) 
Total (N) 
Self-employed who exited their business within the first 6 years after startups 
Shortly prior to exit 237 (72%) $3,401 $0 327 
At the time of exit 324 (95%) $1,548 $0 341 
Self-employed who survived at least 6 years 
Shortly prior to exit 34 (29%) $17,263 $3,106 116 
After 5 years from entry 52 (22%) $27,043 $11,384 237 
Note: All income is inflated by CPI-U in 2009 dollar. 
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Appendix 3. Different classifications of risk attitude dummy variables 
 (1) Frailty Hazard 
(2)  
Frailty Hazard 
(3) 
Cox 
proportional  
(4) 
Frailty Hazard 
Panel A     
Risk2  0.96 (-0.14) 
0.98 
(-0.08) 
0.98 
(-0.13) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
Risk3 0.71 ( -1.47) 
0.75 
(-1.21) 
0.85 
(-1.03) 
0.79 
(-0.95) 
Risk4 0.62 (-2.25)b 
0.65 
(-1.95)c 
0.81 
(-1.54) 
0.67 
(-1.79)c 
Panel B     
Willingness to take medium risk 
(risk2) 
  0.96 
(-0.14) 
0.98 
(-0.08) 
0.98 
(-0.13) 
1.03 
(0.08) 
Willingness to take high risk 
(risk3+risk4) 
0.65 
(-2.31)b 
0.69 
(-1.97)b 
0.83 
(-1.61) 
0.72 
(-1.72)c 
Panel C     
Willingness to take medium risk 
(risk2+risk3) 
0.79 
(-1.15) 
0.82 
(-0.93) 
0.90 
(-0.82) 
0.87 
( -0.65) 
Willingness to take high risk 
(risk4) 
0.62 
(-2.25)b 
0.65 
(-1.95)c 
0.81 
(-1.54) 
0.67 
(-1.80)c 
Panel D     
Willingness to take medium risk 
(risk3) 
0.71 
(-1.48) 
0.75 
(-1.23) 
0.86 
(-1.03) 
0.79 
(-1.00) 
Willingness to take high risk 
(risk4) 
0.62 
 (-2.30)b 
0.65 
(-2.01)b 
0.81 
(-1.57) 
0.67 
(-1.89)c 
Note: In Panel A, the categorical variable of 4-point risk acceptance index is converted to four risk attitudes 
dummies. Risk1 indicates the most risk aversion and Risk4 the least risk aversion. Willingness to take low 
risk (Risk 1) is used as base in Panel B and C. The consolidated category of Risk1 and Risk2 is used as base 
in Panel D. t- statistics reported in parenthesis. a/b/c significance level at 1%/5%/10%. 
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Appendix 4. Effect of AFQT score on risk attitudes  
Panel A Effect of AFQT score on risk attitudes 
Risk attitudes (1) OLS (2) Ordered Probit (3) Ordered Probit 
Marginal effect 
AFQT 0.002 (1.87)* 0.002 (2.24)** 0.009 
Education 0.006 (0.70) 0.005 (0.67) 0.002 
Male  0.206 (6.40)*** 0.184 (6.25)*** 0.036 
Age -0.222 (1.10) -0.205 (1.12) 0.091 
Age squared 0.003 (1.06) 0.003 (1.08) 0.088 
White 0.015 (0.40) 0.010 (0.28) 0.002 
log(family income) -0.051 (2.34)** -0.047 (2.31)** 0.009 
Number of kids -0.023 (1.64)* -0.022 (1.68)* 0.005 
Married -0.194 (5.04) *** -0.169 (4.80)*** 0.033 
Previous labor market 
experience 
-0.014 (2.88) *** -0.012 (2.85)*** 0.010 
Constant 6.208 (1.95)*   
/cut1  -3.782 [2.91]  
/cut2  -3.474 [2.91]  
/cut3  -2.983 [2.91]  
Panel B Marginal and discrete changes in predicted probabilities for each outcome of risk attitudes in 
Ordered probit 
 Average  
Change 
Risk 
acceptance 
index=1 
Risk 
acceptance 
index=2 
Risk 
acceptance 
index=3 
Risk 
acceptance 
index=4 
AFQT 0.009 -0.018 0.000 0.004 0.014 
Education 0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.004 
Male 0.036 -0.073 0.001 0.014 0.058 
Age 0.091 0.182 -0.003 -0.035 -0.144 
Age squared 0.088 -0.175 0.003 0.034 0.139 
white 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Log(family income) 0.009 0.017 -0.000 -0.003 -0.014 
Number of Kids 0.005 0.011 -0.000 -0.002 -0.009 
Married 0.033 0.067 -0.001 -0.013 -0.053 
Previous labor market 
experience 
0.010 0.020 -0.000 -0.004 -0.016 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are in bracket. ***/**/* significance level at 
1%/5%/10%. 4 regions are controlled. 
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CHAPTER 4. ARE RISK ATTITUDES FIXED FACTORS OR FLEETING 
FEELINGS? 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the theory of economic decision under uncertainty typically presumes 
that individuals have time-invariant risk preferences, a series of empirical papers have 
raised doubts about the validity of the presumed stable risk preferences.  More than two 
decades ago, Love and Robison (1984) examined the intertemporal stability of risk 
preferences using a data set including just 23 American farmers.  Individual’s risk 
preferences were elicited through choices between pairs of possible incomes at four 
different income levels in 1979 and again in 1981.  They found that risk preferences 
were not stable over time, although they could not establish a firm pattern of change in 
risk preferences over two years.  More recently, Andersen et al. (2008), using 97 Danish 
adults from experiments, found that individual’s risk attitudes change over a 17-month 
time period, but they also could not establish a definable pattern of either positive or 
negative change in risk preferences across time.  While optimistic perceptions of 
personal financial security tend to reduce risk aversion, no other demographic 
characteristic was correlated with variation in risk attitudes across time.  In both studies, 
relatively short time spans and few observations per individual made it difficult to draw 
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any conclusions beyond the apparent instability of risk preferences.  That leaves open 
the possibility that instability is due more to random measurement errors in risk 
measurement than to a behavioral response to changing economic circumstances.  
Past studies have tried to establish how various economic or demographic 
attributes ‘cause’ attitudes toward risk using cross-sectional data.  The evidence is 
uneven.  Donkers et al. (2001) find that more educated and higher income individuals 
are less risk averse.  Hartog et al. (2002) also find that wealthier individuals are less risk 
averse.  However, Barsky et al. (1997) show that risk aversion increases with income 
and wealth for the lower half of their distributions.  Donkers et al. (2001), Barsky et al. 
(1997), and Riley and Chow (1992) all find that risk aversion varies by age, but they 
disagree on the direction of the correlation.  The most consistent finding is that women 
are more risk averse than men (Donkers et al., 2001; Hartog et al., 2002).  Halek and 
Eisenhauer (2001) find that the unemployed are less risk averse than job holders.  
A more recent strand of the literature has begun to question whether measures of 
risk aversion depend on the risk elicitation method.  Barseghyan et al. (2011) found that 
households tend to be more risk averse when facing hypothetical deductible decisions 
involving home insurance compared to auto insurance.  Anderson and Mellor (2009) 
find that risk preferences obtained from experiments using real money prizes are not 
consistent with those inferred from surveys with hypothetical gambles.  Binswanger 
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(1980) observed that the distribution of measured risk aversion shifts to the right as 
proposed payoffs increase in a field experiment in India.  Holt and Laury (2002) derive 
the same conclusion in a sample of American students.  
Another strand of literature suggests that individual risk attitudes depend on 
feelings or emotions at the time risk is assessed.  Raghunathan and Pham (1999) find 
that anxiety makes people more risk averse whereas sadness makes people less risk 
averse.  Lerner and Keltner (2000) show that fearful people are more pessimistic and so 
they are less likely to take on risk.  In a similar vein, but focusing on personal 
experience on stock market returns, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that people who 
experienced higher stock market returns show greater willingness to take risk.  
While there appears to be consensus that measured risk preferences vary with 
elicitation mechanisms at a point in time, there is less evidence that measures of risk 
preferences using the same elicitation method are subject to change over time.  Finding 
cross-sectional variation in risk preferences across individuals at one point in time does 
not prove that individual risk preferences are unstable.  This chapter explores the log-
term stability of measured risk preferences by exploiting a 13-year longitudinal sample of 
individuals in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79) over which risk 
attitudes were elicited on four different waves.  The longer time series allows us to 
evaluate not just whether preferences are stable, but whether variation in preferences is 
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dominated by variation in risk preferences across individuals or by variation in individual 
risk preferences over time.  Furthermore, the large sample size and long time frame 
allow us to identify some clear regularities in how risk attitudes change due to individual 
economic circumstances.    
We find dramatic evidence that measured risk preferences for individuals are not 
stable:  57% of the total variance in measured risk aversion is attributable to changing 
individual risk attitudes over time and only 43% to variation across individuals.  Even 
after controlling for plausible demographic and economic factors that might alter 
individual attitudes toward risk, the within variance due to unexplained changes in 
individual risk aversion over time dominates the between variance across individuals. To 
the extent that the within variation is an indication of measurement error, over half of the 
variation in measured risk preferences is noise, suggesting that there will be significant 
bias when such measures are included in regressions explaining economic behavior.  
Although many cross-sectional studies found that demographic variables such as 
age, education, and marriage are correlated with variation in risk aversion, we find that 
changing personal economic circumstances have a greater impact on individual risk 
aversion than do changing demographics.  Individuals become more risk averse as their 
incomes rise and as the duration of a current employment spell increases.  Risk aversion 
also increases with duration of time spent out of the labor force and with accumulated 
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work experience.  In contrast, risk aversion decreases with length of a current 
unemployment spell.  Because risk preferences respond to current economic 
circumstances, they cannot be viewed as causal factors in studies of contemporaneous 
economic decisions such as occupational choice, earnings, or entrepreneurship. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews data and 
measures of risk aversion.  Section 3 discusses empirical methodologies for testing the 
intertemporal stability of risk aversion.  Empirical results that reject the stability of risk 
aversion are presented in section 4.   
2. Data and Measures of Risk Aversion 
The data is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79).  The 
NLSY79 offers a consistently designed lifetime income gamble questions to respondents 
in 1993, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  
In the hypothetical gamble questions, the individual is asked to choose between a 
safe job paying a fixed current income and a risky job that will return a higher expected 
return but with a chance of income below the safe level.  The risk questions are as 
follows: 
 
(Q1) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your 
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(family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you 
take the new job? 
 
The individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked: (Q2) suppose the chances 
were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. 
Would you still take the new job? Those who answered ‘no’ to the first question (Q1) then asked: 
(Q3) suppose the changes were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it 
would cut it by 20 percent. Would you take the new job? 
 
Responses to the series of gamble questions are used to elicit measures of risk 
aversion.  Degree of risk aversion is measured by the degree to which the respondent is 
willing to accept downside risk, measured by the amount that could be reduced.  We 
construct an ordered categorical risk aversion index ranging from 1 to 4 and so the risk 
index goes from the least to the most risk averse.  
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Our sample includes all respondents who answered the risk questions in at least 
two years between 1993 and 2006.  We drop households that report zero net family 
income which excludes less than 1% of the sample.  We also drop those who have 
incomplete information on demographics.  Our conclusions are not sensitive to these 
sample inclusion criteria.  The final sample is large: 5,197 respondents answered the risk 
questions in 1993; 5,424 in 2002; 5,387 in 2004; 5,698 in 2006, and 3,805 in all four 
years.  The final analysis sample contains 21,706 person-year observations.  Therefore, 
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our study uses a much larger sample than the past longitudinal studies which had at most 
300 observations.   
Distributions of measured risk aversion in the unbalanced panel sample over time 
are reported in Panel A of Table 1.  Most respondents fall into the most risk averse 
category and the second largest portion into the least risk averse category.  This suggests 
that there is considerable heterogeneity in risk attitudes across individuals.  There is a 
tendency for increasing risk aversion with age: 46% were in the most risk averse category 
in 1993 but 57% in 2006.  The largest decline is in the least risk averse group which falls 
from 25% to 17%.  However, the progression to greater average risk aversion with age 
masks considerable variation in the patterns of changing risk aversion across individuals 
as shown in Panel B of Table 1.  Panel B focuses on the balanced panel of 3,805 
individuals who answered the risk aversion question all four years.  We show the 
distribution of 2006 risk aversion measures by 1993 measured risk aversion.  Only 43% 
remained in the same risk aversion category over 13 years.  Only 2% stayed in the same 
risk aversion category all four years.   
As in Panel B, there is a movement toward greater average risk aversion as age 
increases:  46% of those in the least risk averse category in 1993 were in the most risk 
averse category in 2006.  However, 33% of those in the most risk averse category in 
1993 became less risk averse in 2006.  The changes in measured aversion are not of 
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modest size as 35% moved at least 2 risk categories between the two periods.  These 
intertemporal changes cannot be explained as just reflecting an aging cohort of 
respondents. 
3. Testing for the stability of risk aversion over time 
 In order to test the presumption that risk aversion is stable over time, we first 
incorporate analysis of variance (ANOVA).  We measure the relative stability of risk 
aversion by assessing how much of the variance in measured risk aversion is attributable 
to variation across individuals and how much is due to variation in individual risk 
aversion over time.  ANOVA allows us to decompose the total variance in responses to 
the income gamble question into ‘between’ individual and ‘within’ individual components.  
The between variance is due to deviations of individual mean risk aversion from the 
sample mean.  The within variance is due to changes in measured risk aversion within an 
individual over time.   
With n individuals in the sample and 4 temporally separated measures of risk 
aversion for each individual i, the total sum of square (TSS) partitioned into sum of 
squared errors (SSE) and sum of squares of treatments (SST) can be written as: 
TSS SSE SST= +  
4
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            2n θs= ×                                              (2) 
where itθ is individual i’s risk aversion measured at time t; 
4
0
1
1
4i itt
θ θ
=
= ∑ represents an 
individual’s average measured risk aversion over 4 years; 0
1
1 n
i
in
θ θ
=
= ∑  denotes the 
sample mean of measured risk aversion across individuals in the sample; and 2θs  is 
variance of measured risk aversion.27   
The SSE corresponding to the first term of equation (1) measures the ‘within’ 
variance due to changes in individuals measured risk aversion, while the second term 
measures the ‘between’ variance due to differences in mean risk preferences across 
individuals.  The TSS can be alternatively estimated by the sum of the two variance 
components or by equation (2).  
We report the variance decomposition in Panel A of table 2.  Surprisingly, 57% 
of the total variance comes from the within individual component and only 43% is due to 
the between variance.  The majority of the variance in risk aversion is due to changing 
individual risk preferences over time and not to different risk preferences across 
individuals.  Nor is this result due to some regular pattern of evolving risk preferences as 
individuals age.   
Panel B reports the within and between variation in risk aversion after controlling 
for a vector itX  of demographic attributes that could explain why individual risk 
                                            
27 See Appendix 2 for full derivation of equation (1). 
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attitudes might change over time: age, marriage, education, and number of kids.   If risk 
preferences change as these demographic attributes change over the sample period, they 
will reduce the within component.  However, after removing the variance attributable to 
these non-economic variables, the within variance falls only to 54% from 57%, and so the 
within component is still larger than the variation across individuals.   
Since the sizeable within component is not due to non-economic factors, it is 
potentially influenced by changing economic circumstances.  We take on that question 
next. 
3.1 What personal economic circumstances affect risk aversion over time?  
 To explore the transitory economic factors that alter measured risk attitudes, we 
first must control for any underlying differences in tastes for risk across individuals.  
That suggests using a fixed-effects regression that will control for unobservable 
individual tastes and all other time-invariant factors ui.  We also add the time-varying 
elements of the vector of demographic factors, Xit, including age and its square, education, 
marital status, and number of children.  We then add a vector of time-varying labor 
market factors, Mit to a regression explaining changes in measured risk preferences over 
time.  The linear regression model with fixed effects is 
it it X it M i itX M uθ β β ε= + + + , 
2~ (0, )it Nε s                    (3) 
As before, itθ is an ordered categorical risk aversion index variable ranging from 
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the least risk averse to the most risk averse for an individual i at time t.  The vector Mit 
contains time-varying measures that reflect individual household and local labor market 
economic status: the net family income and its square, years of previous labor market 
experience, the duration of recent employment, unemployment, and out of labor force 
spells, and the local unemployment rate.  Gender, race, and other factors that do not 
change over the sample period are absorbed by the individual fixed effects. 
It is possible that measures of degree of risk aversion are nonlinear.  Thus, 
alternatively we estimate an ordered probit model.  More specifically, random effect 
ordered probit model and an ordered probit model clustering the standard errors on the 
level of the individual are incorporated to show our results are robust to the alternative 
specifications.  
3.2 Measures of Key Independent Variables 
 Weekly labor force information and interview date are available in the NLSY79.  
Accordingly, we were able to identify each individual’s labor force status—employed, 
unemployed, or out of labor force—at the time individual risk aversion was measured.  
Unemployed individuals and those out of labor force differ in that the unemployed are 
actively looking for a job while those out of labor force are neither working nor looking 
for work.  Hence, the unemployed are constrained from their presumed preferred time 
allocation (employment) while those out of the labor force are in control of their time 
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allocation.  The employed are also nominally meeting their time allocation objectives.  
Our measure is the length of the current time allocation spell since the last interview and 
so the maximum length of the current spell is 2 years.  
Previous labor market experience is measured by cumulative years spent at work 
since the first survey year, 1979.  Net family income variable is created by NLSY79 at 
each wave.  The descriptive statistics of variables are summarized in Appendix 1.  
4. Results 
 Table 3 reports estimation results using various model specifications.  The first 
four columns are fixed effects estimates of the linear model.  In the first column, age and 
age-squared are the only regressors.  Age has a significant effect on changes in measured 
risk aversion over time.  Risk aversion increases until age 52 and then decreases.28  The 
R-squared statistic is the ratio of the between variance to the total variance and so the 
within and between variances can be inferred by the R-squared statistic.  As 57% of the 
total variance was due to the within-individual component without controlling for any 
cofactors, removing only the variation in age lowers the within component to 54%.  
When we add the other time-varying non-economic variables—education, marriage, and 
number of kids—the proportion of total variance attributable to the within component 
remains 54%.   
                                            
28 In the study of Barsky et. al (1997) using older cohorts (age between 50 and 70) from Health and Retired 
Study (HRS), risk aversion starts to decrease at age 60 without controlling for any factors. 
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 When we include only time-varying economic variables in the third column, the 
within component is also 54%.  We then let the non-economic and economic variables 
compete with one another in column 4.  The within variance remains at 54%.  However, 
we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that the effect of the demographic factors on 
risk preferences is jointly zero (F5,n-5=1.72, p>0.1).29  On the other hand, the effect of the 
economic factors are jointly significant (F7,n-7=5.49, p=0.00).  Hence, economic 
circumstances rather than demographic variation are the more important observable 
source of changing risk attitudes over time.  Nevertheless, the dominant source of 
variation in risk preferences remains the within component, even after controlling for 
economic and demographic variables.    
When economic variables are added, the relationship between age and risk 
aversion weakens.  Peak risk aversion now occurs at age 43 and decreasing thereafter.  
The weakening effect of age on risk preferences is due to the correlation between age and 
risking income and job security, both of which raise risk aversion.  This nonlinear effect 
of age on risk aversion conflicts with findings from single cross-sectional studies that risk 
aversion rises monotonically with age (Riley and Chow, 1992; Donkers et al., 2001; 
Dohmen et al., 2006) but is similar to results reported by Barsky et al. (1997).  Unlike 
                                            
29 Marital status, fertility behavior and education may be a consequence of risk preferences rather than a 
causal factor.  However, none of our results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these factors, and 
so we include them for completeness. 
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earlier conclusions based on studies using a single cross-section, changes in education do 
not affect measured risk aversion.  And changes in marital status have only small effects 
that are statistically significant only at the 10% level.    
 Changing economic circumstances do influence risk preferences by statistically 
significant but numerically small amounts.  Risk aversion increases with net family 
income at a decreasing rate with peak risk aversion at $307 thousand.  In other words, 
household become increasingly risk averse as income rises for virtually the entire range 
of household income.  Because age and income are positively correlated, conclusions 
regarding the pattern of risk preferences by age in previous studies may have been 
clouded by the underlying correlation between age and household economic status.  Our 
results that risk preferences rise with income are consistent with Barsky et al. (1997) and 
Bellemare and Brown (2010).   
Previous studies argued that more risk-averse job seekers exit unemployment 
faster (Stephenson 1976; Feinberg 1977) or that the employed are more risk averse than 
the unemployed (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001).  However, the direction of causality is 
uncertain when based solely on cross-sectional data.  The longitudinal data used in this 
study allows us to investigate whether the duration of employment, unemployment, or out 
of labor force spells affect risk preferences.  We find that among those who are currently 
employed, risk aversion increases with the duration of employment spell.  Risk aversion 
114 
 
 
also increases with the duration of time spent out of the labor force.  To the extent that 
employment or out of labor force are the desired state, these results suggest that risk 
aversion increases with persistence in success at time allocation decisions.  In contrast, 
risk aversion decreases with length of current unemployment spell or persistent lack of 
success in time allocation.  A one standard deviation increase in weeks of a current 
employment spell raises risk aversion by 1.6%, evaluated at sample means.  A one 
standard deviation increase in time out of the labor force increases risk aversion by 1.4%.  
On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in unemployment spell lowers risk 
aversion by 0.5%.   
These effects are quite small.  It takes a consistent spell of 1-2 years to move 
measured risk preferences up or down by one point.  Nevertheless, individuals are more 
responsive to current spells than accumulated labor market experience.  A 52 week 
current employment spell raises risk aversion 3 times more than one year of accumulated 
work experience.   
 The last two columns remove the fixed effects and allow nonlinearities in the 
measured risk aversion using an ordered probit specification.  These estimates allow us 
to show that some of the demographic effects are captured by the individual fixed effects 
as marital status and education do not change for large fractions of the sample.  In 
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addition, males are significantly less risk averse than women.  However, the signs and 
significance of the economic variables remain intact.   
 Regardless of specification, we easily reject the hypothesis that risk preferences 
do not respond to current and accumulated household economic circumstances.30  The 
implication is that risk preferences are endogenous to economic success.  One cannot use 
contemporaneously measured risk preferences to ‘explain’ labor market decisions 
regarding search, employment, or labor force participation.  With extended periods of 
unemployment or employment, risk preferences can change substantially.  Recent work 
of Malmendier and Nagel (2011) also suggests that personal economic experiences of 
macroeconomic shocks explain individual risk preferences.  They show that experiences 
of high stock market returns makes individuals less risk averse and so risk preferences are 
indeed endogenous to personal economic experiences, which is consistent with our 
conclusion.  
 The main story from section 3 remains.  Variation in measured risk preferences 
are dominated by changes in individual risk preferences that are uncorrelated with 
demographics or changing economic circumstances.  These apparent random 
measurement errors in risk preferences suggest that one should use considerable caution 
                                            
30 Expanding the sample to include individuals with on partial information on demographic or economic 
variables does not change our conclusions. See Appendix 3.   
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in using measured risk preferences to test theoretical propositions regarding how risk 
attitudes influence economic choices. 
5. Conclusion 
 Risk aversion plays an important role in economic decision.  Economists often 
use measured risk aversion as fixed attitudes toward risk.  This chapter attempts to find 
the empirical validity of the typical presumption.  Utilizing panel structure of the 
NLSY79 over a 13-year span, we find unstable temporal measured risk aversion.  
Individuals’ risk aversion changes systematically responding to personal economic 
circumstances over time.  Although many cross-sectional studies found that non-
economic factors are correlated with variation in risk aversion, we find that personal 
economic circumstances have more important effects on intertemporal change in 
individual risk aversion.  Length of employment spells or out of labor force increases 
risk aversion whereas duration of unemployment spells decreases risk aversion.  Years 
of accumulated labor market experience also positively affects to shape risk aversion.  
Risk aversion has an inverted U-shape relation with household Income and age.  Risk 
aversion decreases at age 43 and at $307 thousand net family income.   
Individual risk aversion is endogenous to personal economic experiences of labor 
force status.  With extended periods of unemployment or employment, risk aversion can 
change substantially.  Our finding suggests that measured risk aversion is indeed not 
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fixed but changing over time corresponding to personal situation.  It seems that in recent 
literature measured risk aversion is more frequently incorporated into the empirical 
analysis owing to data availability.  But, researchers should remain cautious in using the 
measured risk aversion.  Contemporaneously measured risk aversion cannot be used as 
an explanatory factor in studies explaining labor market decisions regarding search, 
employment, or labor force participation.  
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Table 1. Distribution of categorical responses to income gamble questions over time 
Panel A: Unbalanced panel 
Risk aversion index 1993  2002  2004  2006  
1: the least risk averse 23.9% 18.0% 16.6% 17.2% 
2 17.1% 16.3% 13.9% 14.9% 
3 12.9% 10.7% 16.1% 11.2% 
4: the most risk averse 46.1% 55.0% 53.4% 56.7% 
Total Observation 5,300 
(100%) 
5,583 
(100%) 
5,540 
(100%) 
5,949 
(100%) 
Panel B: Balanced panel subset 
Risk aversion index 
1993 
Risk aversion index 2006 
1 2 3 4 Total 
1: the least risk averse  6.2% 
(26.0%) 
4.0% 
(17.0%) 
2.8% 
(12.0%) 
10.9% 
(46.0%) 
23.8% 
(100%) 
2 2.9% 
(16.8%) 
3.5% 
(20.6%) 
2.0% 
(11.8%) 
8.7% 
(50.8%) 
17.1% 
(100%) 
3 1.8% 
(13.8) 
1.9% 
(14.6%) 
2.5% 
(18.9%) 
7.0% 
(52.7%) 
13.3% 
(100%) 
4: the most risk averse 5.3% 
(11.5%) 
5.3% 
(11.5%) 
4.7% 
(10.3%) 
30.6% 
(66.7%) 
45.8% 
(100%) 
Total  16.1% 14.7% 12.0% 57.1% 100.0% 
Note: Top number is the percentage of all observations. Number in parentheses is the related row 
proportion.  
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Table 2. Variance Decomposition of measured risk aversion (θ ) 
 Within variance (SSE) Between variance (SST) Total 
varianc
e (TSS) 
Panel A    
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Table 3. Effects of economic factors on change in risk aversion over time 
 Linear Regression Ordered Probit 
 Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Betaa Random 
effects 
Clustering 
Time-varying economic factors      
Family income/100,000   0.172*** 
(3.34) 
0.135** 
(2.46) 
0.069 0.117** 
(2.46) 
0.088** 
(2.06) 
(Family income/100,000)2   -0.029** 
(2.52) 
-0.022* 
(1.86) 
-0.043 -0.031*** 
(2.91) 
-0.029*** 
(3.04) 
Recent weeks employed    0.001*** 
(3.99) 
0.001*** 
(3.83) 
0.045 0.002*** 
(6.23) 
0.002*** 
(6.43) 
Recent weeks 
unemployed  
  -0.001** 
(2.12) 
-0.001** 
(2.03) 
-0.015 -0.002*** 
(3.46) 
-0.002*** 
(3.71) 
Recent weeks out of labor 
force 
  0.002*** 
(3.87) 
0.002*** 
(3.33) 
0.037 0.002*** 
(5.14) 
0.002*** 
(5.49) 
Labor market experience 
(in years) 
  0.016*** 
(6.00) 
0.012** 
(1.98) 
0.069 0.014*** 
(5.68) 
0.012*** 
(5.42) 
State unemployment rate   0.003 
(0.54) 
0.0002 
(0.38) 
0.004 0.0003 
(0.56) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
Non-economic controls      
Age 0.074*** 
(3.61) 
0.072*** 
(3.40) 
 0.042** 
(1.96) 
0.192 0.035 
(1.53) 
0.029 
(1.36) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
(2.60) 
-0.001** 
(2.39) 
 -0.000* 
(1.74) 
-0.171 -0.0004 
(1.33)   
-0.0003 
(1.16) 
Education (in years)  -0.027 
(1.31) 
 -0.026 
(1.27) 
-0.054 -0.010* 
(1.94) 
-0.007* 
(1.66) 
Number of children  0.004 
(0.30) 
 -0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.0001 0.011 
(1.24) 
0.010 
(1.26) 
Married  0.084** 
(2.74) 
 0.056* 
(1.73) 
0.023 0.100*** 
(3.88) 
0.099*** 
(4.23) 
Male      -0.216*** 
(8.88) 
-0.187*** 
(9.12) 
White      0.027 
(1.05) 
0.022 
(0.98) 
Constant 0.184 
(0.48) 
0.522 
(1.14) 
1.517*** 
(24.27) 
2.043*** 
(4.36) 
   
R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46    
1-R2 (within variance %) 54% 54% 54% 54%    
Total observation (n) 21,706 21,706 21,706 21,706  21,706 21,706 
Cut1      0.016 
[0.438] 
0.028 
[0.395] 
Cut2      0.603 
[0.438] 
0.522 
[0.395] 
Cut3      1.003 
[0.438] 
0.858 
[0.395] 
Note: a Fully standardized coefficients.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean (Std) 
Variables Definition 1993 2002 2004 2006 
Risk aversion index Ordered categorical variable (1-4) 
1 = the least risk averse 
4 = the most risk averse 
2.81 
(1.24) 
3.03 
(1.19) 
3.07 
(1.15) 
3.09 
(1.18) 
Net Family income  39,251 
(31,314) 
63,011 
(58,545) 
68,002 
(65,670) 
74,707 
(75,604) 
Recent length of 
employment   
Weeks employed in past 2 years if 
currently employed 
34.17 
(21.55) 
75.14 
(39.42) 
74.09 
(39.66) 
75.97 
(38.52) 
Recent length of 
unemployment   
Weeks unemployed in past 2 years 
if currently unemployed 
1.61 
(10.35) 
1.84 
(12.69) 
5.71 
(23.10) 
6.01 
(23.44) 
Recent length of out of 
labor force 
Weeks out of labor force in past 2 
years if currently out of labor force 
6.54 
(17.53) 
10.20 
(28.74) 
14.60 
(34.35) 
12.07 
(31.56) 
Work experience Previously labor market experience 
(in years) 
10.35 
(3.92) 
17.56 
(5.67) 
19.08 
(6.10) 
20.65 
(6.37) 
Unemployment rate Local unemployment rate 7.49 
(2.57) 
6.68 
(2.41) 
5.71 
(1.51) 
5.02 
(1.49) 
Age Age (in years) 31.58 
(2.25) 
40.55 
(2.25) 
42.55 
(2.25) 
44.55 
(2.26) 
Education (in year) Years in schooling 13.16 
(2.42) 
13.36 
(2.48) 
13.39 
(2.49) 
13.42 
(2.50) 
Number of kids Number of kids in household 1.37 
(1.28) 
1.44 
(1.29) 
1.34 
(1.25) 
1.25 
(1.22) 
Married = 1 if married 0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
Male = 1 if male 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
White = 1 if female 0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.64 
(0.47) 
Total observation (n)  5,197 5,424 5,387 5,698 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Appendix 2 
 
With n individuals in the sample and 4 temporally separated measures of risk aversion for 
each individual i, the total sum of square (TSS) is given by 
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Appendix 3. Effects of economic factors on change in risk aversion over time with 
different total observations 
 Linear Regression Ordered Probit 
 Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Betaa Random 
effects 
Clustering 
Time-varying economic factors      
Family income/100,000   0.173*** 
(3.35) 
0.136** 
(2.48) 
0.072 0.113** 
(2.43) 
0.093** 
(2.20) 
(Family income/100,000)2   -0.029** 
(2.53) 
-0.022* 
(1.87) 
-0.044 -0.030*** 
(2.84) 
-0.030*** 
(3.15) 
Recent weeks employed    0.001*** 
(3.99) 
0.001*** 
(3.84) 
0.052 0.002*** 
(5.98) 
0.002*** 
(6.33) 
Recent weeks unemployed    -0.001*** 
(2.12) 
-0.001** 
(2.03) 
-0.008 -0.002 
(3.28) 
-0.002*** 
(3.54) 
Recent weeks out of labor 
force 
  0.002*** 
(3.87) 
0.002*** 
(3.33)) 
0.045 0.002 
(5.20) 
0.002*** 
(5.57) 
Labor market experience  
(in years) 
  0.016*** 
(6.00) 
0.012** 
(1.98) 
0.081 0.015*** 
(6.15) 
0.012*** 
(5.63) 
State unemployment rate   0.0003 
(0.53) 
0.0002 
(0.37) 
0.003 0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.61) 
Non-economic controls      
Age 0.067*** 
(3.65) 
0.064*** 
(3.37) 
 0.042* 
(1.93) 
0.157 0.037 
(1.61) 
0.030 
(1.45) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
(2.51) 
-0.001** 
(2.24) 
 -0.0004* 
(1.73) 
-0.149 -0.0004 
(1.43) 
-0.0003 
(1.25) 
Education (in years)  -0.024 
(1.35) 
 -0.026 
(1.27) 
-0.039 -0.012** 
(2.42) 
-0.008* 
(1.90) 
Number of children  0.007 
(0.64) 
 0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.001 0.013 
(1.46) 
0.011 
(1.40) 
Married  0.066** 
(2.40) 
 0.056* 
(1.73) 
.020 0.103*** 
(4.06) 
0.095*** 
(4.10) 
Male      -0.207*** 
(8.71) 
-0.184 
(9.07) 
White      0.029 
(1.13) 
0.022 
(1.02) 
Constant 1.300***  
(3.79) 
1.631*** 
(4.02) 
2.516*** 
(40.33) 
2.046*** 
(4.37) 
   
R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47    
1-R2 (within variance %) 53% 53% 53% 53%    
Observations (n) 25,784 25,783 22,042 22,042 22,042 22,042 22,042 
Cut1      -0.007 
[0.428] 
0.048 
[0.390] 
Cut2      0.577 
[0.428] 
0.540 
[0.390] 
Cut3      0.972 
[0.428] 
0.874 
[0.390] 
Note: a Fully standardized coefficients. Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets. 
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%. 
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CHAPTER 5. ARE NONPROFIT ENTREPRENEURS ALSO “JACKS-OF-ALL-
TRADES”? 
 
1. Introduction 
 The motivation to enter entrepreneurship involves a potentially unobservable 
skill for organizing the talents of more specialized employees to produce output (Lazear 
2004,2005).  By exploiting returns to scale from this entrepreneurial talent, the earnings 
from the owner’s share of firm profits can dominate earnings expected from working for 
someone else.  The main implication of Lazear’s “Jacks-of-All-Trades” theory is that the 
pattern of human capital investment differs across entrepreneurs and those in paid 
employment—entrepreneurs acquire more varied skills necessary to run a business while 
those they employ specialize in more occupation-specific and narrowly focused skills.  
Several studies have provided empirical evidence that for-profit entrepreneurs are 
generalists with balanced skills while paid workers are specialists (e.g., Wagner, 2006; 
Backes-Gellner and Moog, 2008; Åstebro and Thompson, 2011; Stuetzer and Kaya, 2011).    
Incentives for starting a nonprofit are less clear because the objective is not tied 
to maximizing expected income or profits.  Accordingly, little attention has been paid to 
the role of entrepreneurial ability in the decision to become a nonprofit entrepreneur.  
Given the rapid increase in new nonprofit organizations, it is important to identify which 
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skills lead to successful nonprofit entrepreneurship.31   
One rationalization for the existence of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) is to 
resolve market failures (Hansmann, 1980; Easley and O’Hara, 1983; Chillemi and Gui, 
1991; Holtmann, 1983).  Nonprofit firms add supply to a market that would otherwise be 
characterized by excess demand.  A second literature argues that goods produced by 
NPOs are imperfect substitutes for goods produced by for-profit firms in the same market.  
Preston (1988) shows that for-profit firms produce goods which generate higher private 
revenue but nonprofits introduce products with higher social benefits.  Focusing on 
differences in quality of services, Mark (1996) empirically tests whether ownership is 
correlated with quality of hospital services and shows that nonprofit hospitals provide 
higher quality than their for-profit counterparts whereas Sloan et al. (2001) find no 
significant difference in quality of service between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.   
A third difference between NPOs and for-profit firms is that nonprofit 
entrepreneurs have different motivations than for-profit entrepreneurs (Young, 1986).  
Hansmann (1980) emphasizes that those who heavily weight nonpecuniary benefits rather 
than pecuniary returns are more likely to enter nonprofit sector.  Supportive of that 
hypothesis, James (1987) finds that religious groups are the major founders of NPOs in 
many countries such as the U.S., India, Japan, Holland and Sweden.  Gassler (1998) 
                                            
31 The number of nonprofit organizations in the U.S. increased 32% between 1999 and 2009 
(http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1.php?state=US ).  
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argued that altruistic motives and Kantian ethics are necessary to explain the existence of 
nonprofit firms on a qualitative analysis basis.  However, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) 
showed that self-interested entrepreneurs could also choose not-for-profit status if they 
placed a large weight on product quality because non-profit firms produce higher quality 
products. 
Although previous studies have explained the existence of nonprofit firms, little 
attention has been paid either theoretically or empirically to the characteristics that cause 
a nonprofit entrepreneur to succeed.  To our best knowledge, this study is the first to 
explore the human capital investments that lead to successful NPO start-ups.  
Data for this analysis were drawn from a random sample of 25,000 Iowa State 
University (ISU) alumni who graduated between 1982 and 2006 with a Bachelor’s degree.  
This novel data set includes nonprofit business experience, for-profit startup background, 
family background and socioeconomic characteristics.  Information on college major(s), 
courses taken, credits obtained, and other academic records were matched with each 
observation in the sample.  
Our extension of Lazear’s model of entrepreneurship shows that diverse skills 
should have a positive effect on the choice of both nonprofit and for-profit start-ups over 
the alternative of working for someone else.  We further posit a hypothesis that the same 
unobservable entrepreneurial skills that are presumed to be important in for-profit 
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ventures are important for nonprofit ventures as well.  
Using successive cohorts of ISU graduates, we first confirm that for-profit 
entrepreneurs are generalists with more occupational diversity while paid-employees are 
specialists, consistent with Lazear (2005).  Furthermore, our empirical finding shows 
that a more balanced skill set increases the choice of nonprofit start-ups, supporting our 
hypothesis that nonprofit entrepreneurs are also “Jacks-of-All-Trades”.  Lastly, we find 
that unobserved factors that jointly affect for-profit and nonprofit start-ups are positively 
correlated, consistent with the presence of a common observed entrepreneurial skill that 
leads to both for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurial success.  In other words, people 
who are atypically more likely to start a for-profit business given their observable skills 
are also more likely to start a nonprofit enterprise, and vice versa.  
 In the next section, we extend the Lazear’s “Jacks-of-All-Trades” model of 
entrepreneurship by adding nonprofit entrepreneurship choice in order to show how 
balanced skills affect nonprofit startups and for-profit startups over the alternative of 
being employed and set out the respective hypotheses.  Section 3 describes data and 
variables used to test the hypotheses.  Empirical methodology is presented in Section 4.  
We report empirical results in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes.  
2. Basic model 
In Lazear (2005)’s model, more balanced skills increase the probability of 
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becoming an entrepreneur.  More diversified skills are required so that entrepreneurs can 
understand and organize the talents of more specialized workers they employ.  Suppose 
that human capital can be decomposed into two skills, x1 and x2.32 If the individual plans 
to work for someone, he would specialize in one or the other skill and his earnings would 
equal ],max[ 21 xx .  If instead he becomes an entrepreneur, he must be able to evaluate 
employees with specializations in either human capital subcomponent, and he can only do 
that effectively if he has skills in both areas.  Consequently, expected earnings for an 
entrepreneur will depend on the extent of his weakest skill: ],min[ 21 xx .  His earnings 
will also incorporate a multiplicative entrepreneurial skill that will be unobserved in 
general, λ.  The choice to become an entrepreneur will depend on which is the larger of 
the two expected earnings.  The individual will become an entrepreneur if 
],max[],min[ 2121 xxxx >λ .  
If H is the amount of time one can invest in skills and time translates directly into 
a quantity of human capital, a specialists’ stock of skill will be either [H,0] or [0,H].  
Entrepreneurs will try to equalize their holdings of both skills so that their skill stock will 
be[ , ]
2 2
H H .  That was the main empirical prediction emphasized by Lazear: that more 
balanced observed skills will increase the likelihood of a for-profit startup.  However, a 
second implication follows from the condition that entrepreneurial entry will occur when 
                                            
32 Lazear shows that the basic predictions of the model still go through when human capital has more than 
two subcomponents 
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2
H Hλ >  or λ>2.  A larger endowment of the unobserved entrepreneurial skill λ  
increases the probability of becoming a for-profit entrepreneur.  To the extent that 
nonprofit entrepreneurs are also trying to maximize output, that same unobservable skill 
could be critical in the probability of starting a successful nonprofit venture.  To explore 
that possibility, we need to add nonprofit entrepreneurship as an additional occupational 
choice in the Lazear’s framework.  
We assume that an individual i is faced with the nonexclusive choices of creating 
a nonprofit start-up, creating a for-profit start-up, or working for someone else.  His 
objective is to maximize the possible returns from devoting his time to working at one or 
possibly more than two alternatives under time constraints.  The returns include 
pecuniary benefits from either for-profit start-up or working for someone and non-
pecuniary benefits from nonprofit start-up.  He possesses two types of skills, 1x and 2x .  
Following Lazear (2005), expected market productivity from wage work will involve 
specializing in his best skill, and so his wage is 𝑤 = max [𝑥1, 𝑥2].  His expected returns 
from a for-profit venture depend on the extent of his weakest skill: 
1 2min[ , ] 2f f f
HY x xλ λ= = .  Similarly, his return from a nonprofit venture depends on 
his weakest skill, but it is the cash equivalent non-pecuniary return to nonprofit 
entrepreneurship which we assume is proportional to the output of the nonprofit: 
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1 2min[ , ] 2n n n
HY x xλ λ= = .   
Working time is assumed to be the only input required for production with Tf  
being time devoted to a for-profit enterprise and Tn  being time devoted to a nonprofit 
venture.  We assume that production in the for-profit and nonprofit firms is also 
influenced by the unobservable entrepreneurial skill λ: ( )f fF Tλ  and ( )n nG Tλ , 
respectively.  We also assume diminishing marginal returns to time which opens up the 
possibility of working more than one occupation at once.  Entrepreneurial talent λ  
increases the marginal product of the time devoted in both for-profit and nonprofit 
enterprises. 
The objective can be written as 
1 2 1 2 1 2{ min[ , ] ( ) min[ , ] ( ) max[ , ]( )}f f f n n n WMax x x F T x x G T x x Tλ λ λ λ+ +        (1) 
subject to f n WT T T T+ + = , 0≥jT for , ,j f n W=  
where , ,f n W indicate for-profit entrepreneurship, nonprofit entrepreneurship, and wage 
employment, respectively. 
The Lagrangian is ( ) ( ) [ ]f f f n n n W f n WL Y F T Y G T wT T T T Tλ λ θ= + + − + + −      (2) 
The first order conditions with respect to ,f n WT T and T  are: 
0
ff f T
Y Fλ θ− ≤  (=0 if * 0)fT >                                       (3) 
0
nn n T
Y Gλ θ− ≤   (=0 if * 0)nT >                                      (4) 
*0 ( 0 0)Ww if Tθ− ≤ = >                                            (5) 
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 Optimal allocation of time among the three choices depends on the marginal 
product of time, entrepreneurial talent, and returns. The individual will start a for-profit 
enterprise if the first equation holds with equality, he will start a nonprofit enterprise if the 
second condition holds, and he will engage in wage work if the third equation holds.  
The individual will devote time to both a for-profit and nonprofit enterprises if  
2
2
n
f
f n Tf
n f T
n
H
GY
HY F
λ λ
λλ
= =                                                (6) 
which implies that 𝜆𝑓2𝐹𝑇𝑓 = 𝜆𝑛2𝐺𝑇𝑛.  Equation (6) indicates that when the individual 
starts both for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises, he will allocate time across the two 
sectors so that the marginal products of the last unit of time expended in each enterprise 
are equal. 
 If the individual specializes in wage work only, we have that: 
 
ff f T
Y F w Hλ < =                                        
       
nn n T
Y G w Hλ < =                                                  (7) 
 An individual will never engage in both wage work and entrepreneurship.  To 
see this, note that to get a return from entrepreneurship, he will need to spread his human 
capital investments across the two skill types, meaning that his human capital will equal 
𝐻
2
.  At least one of the following conditions must hold to both work for a wage and be an 
entrepreneur: 
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 𝑌𝑓𝜆𝑓𝐹𝑇𝑓 = 𝜆𝑓2 𝐻2 𝐹𝑇𝑓 = 𝑤 = 𝐻2    
𝑌𝑛𝜆𝑛𝐺𝑇𝑛 = 𝜆𝑛2 𝐻2 𝐺𝑇𝑛 = 𝑤 = 𝐻2              (8) 
But the wage worker could have specialized in human capital, and so the wage 
will be less than H in both cases, and so the individual would not have chosen to become 
an entrepreneur.   
In practice, virtually everyone will engage in wage work at some time over the 
life cycle.  For individuals aspiring to entrepreneurship, wage work is an investment in 
skills to be used later as an entrepreneur.  On the other hand, the theory demonstrates 
that a higher draw on the unobservable λ  gives the decision maker an incentive to 
become both a for-profit and a nonprofit entrepreneur over the alternative of working for 
a wage.  An important implication is that if fλ and nλ are positively correlated, an 
increase in either fλ  or nλ  will increase the probability of both types of 
entrepreneurship and decrease the probability of wage work. 
Four testable hypotheses emerge from the theory: 
Hypothesis 1: An individual with more balanced skills is more likely to become 
a for-profit entrepreneur. 
Hypothesis 2: An individual with more balanced skills is more likely to become 
a nonprofit entrepreneur. 
Hypothesis 3: More balanced skills decrease the probability of entering paid-
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employment.  
Hypothesis 4: Unobserved entrepreneurial talent will raise the probability of both 
for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurship, and so there will be a positive 
correlation in the error terms derived from models of for-profit and nonprofit 
entry. 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on Iowa State University (ISU) Bachelor’s degree 
alumni survey data, which is an excellent and novel source of data for conducting 
research on non-profit entrepreneurship.  The 5,416 usable responses are obtained from 
a random sample of 25,000 ISU alumni who graduated between 1982 and 2006.  The 
data set provides detailed information on respondents’ employment histories, for-profit 
and nonprofit business start-ups, and socioeconomic characteristics.  In addition, these 
data were matched with each student’s academic record, so we were able to get 
information on college major(s), courses taken inside and outside of the major, and even 
high school rank.  
Nonprofit entrepreneurs are defined as those who ever started a nonprofit 
organization during their career.  Likewise, for-profit entrepreneurs are identified as 
having ever initiated a for-profit enterprise.  Individuals working for salary or wages at 
the time of the survey are categorized as wage workers.  This means that some 
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respondents fall into more than one category.  Table 1 shows the distribution of 
respondents who fall either one or both categories of nonprofit and for-profit start-up.  
About 45% of nonprofit entrepreneurs (or 63 out of 140 nonprofit entrepreneurs) also 
become for-profit entrepreneurs.  This distribution suggests that entrepreneurial skills 
that lead to for-profit start-up could also play a role in the decision to start a nonprofit 
venture. 
 We place individuals who started as wage workers but became full-time 
entrepreneurs later in the entrepreneurial category because wage work can serve as a 
means of acquiring human capital for the venture.  On the other hand, if an individual 
started a for-profit or nonprofit venture that failed and returned to wage work, we include 
them in both the wage worker and entrepreneurial occupations.  That definition seems 
consistent with the Lazear framework where diversity of occupational experiences may 
be selected as a means to becoming an entrepreneur later, while individuals who misjudge 
their entrepreneurial venture and switch to wage work are clearly choosing 
entrepreneurial and wage work as separate occupations. In the data, 27% of the for-profit 
entrepreneurs and 20% of the not-for-profit entrepreneurs left their enterprises and 
returned to wage work. 
3.1 Explanatory variables  
The theory says that entrepreneurs will invest in balanced skills to manage their 
138 
 
 
employed specialists efficiently.  For our analysis, we include three measures of 
entrepreneurial skills as indicators of a balanced skill set.  In the ISU alumni survey, 
respondents were asked to report the number of different jobs held since obtaining 
Bachelor’s degree.33  After reporting the total number of different jobs, respondents 
subsequently answered the question, “what occupations have you had in these jobs? 
Check all that apply”.  Accordingly, we first measure the balanced skill set by the total 
number of different occupations associated with those jobs held since graduation, which 
is denoted by Occupations.  The second measure is the total number of industries in 
which the jobs were located, denoted by Industries.34  Higher values of these variables 
reflect more balanced skills.   
Lazear (2005) found that students with a more balanced university curriculum 
were more likely to enter entrepreneurship while those with general curricula chose to 
work for someone else.  Hence, we include an academic skill set as a third measure of a 
balanced skill set.  We measure an academic skill set by the difference between total 
number of courses taken in the major and the average number of courses taken in other 
departments, defined as Course-specialization.  Lower value of this measure indicates a 
                                            
33 We may measure a balanced skill set by number of different jobs ever held since graduation. The number 
of different jobs, however, does not necessarily reflect the degree of different work experience because 
some different jobs may be classified into the same occupation category or they are in the same industry.  
Because of this possibility, we count the total number of occupations and industries in which the jobs were 
located.  Nevertheless, the results are not sensitive to this alternative measure.  
34 Distributions of each employment type by industries and occupations are reported in the appendix Table 
A-2 and A-3, respectively. 
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more diverse academic program.  
 As additional control variables, we include parental business experience because 
entrepreneurial ability can be passed from parents to their offspring (Lentz and Laband, 
1990).  A set of other control variables includes age, age-squared, gender, race, marital 
status at graduation, parental education, close friends’ business experience, and 
information on academic record such as high school rank, college GPA, and college 
dummies.  
Table 2 shows some descriptive evidence on how the nonprofit and for-profit 
entrepreneurs are similar and how entrepreneurs in either sector differ from paid-
employees.  First of all, individuals who became for-profit entrepreneurs have, on 
average, higher number of occupations than paid-employees.  The average number of 
different occupations held by for-profit entrepreneurs is 37% higher than that for paid-
employees.  Similarly, the average number of different occupations held by nonprofit 
entrepreneurs is 27% higher than paid-employees.  For-profit and nonprofit 
entrepreneurs also average more industries of employment compared to wage workers.  
The pattern is less clear cut with respect to academic diversity.  For-profit entrepreneurs 
took the broadest academic programs, but there were no substantial differences between 
nonprofit entrepreneurs and wage workers.  
On average, nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs were from families that owned 
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a business and had less educated parents than did wage workers.  Entrepreneurs were 
weaker students in both high school and college.  Entrepreneurs came from all colleges, 
and so choice of major did not dictate a path to entrepreneurship. 
4. Methodology 
In order to assess the proposed hypotheses whether entrepreneurial ability plays 
an important role in determining a nonprofit startup, we employ trivariate probit model 
which is suitable for allowing correlation among three choices.  
The model to be estimated is based on a latent regression: 
jjjjjj ZXy εγβ ++=
* ,                                            (9) 
)0(1 * >= jj yy , j=f, n, W                                           (10) 
where j=n for nonprofit startup, f for for-profit startup and W for paid employment.  The 
latent variable *jy  represents the value of an occupation j relative to other alternatives. 
The vector X contains two occupational diversity measures (Occupations, Industries) and 
one academic skill measure (Course_specialization).  As control variables, Z is a vector 
of demographic variables that potentially alter the relative return to the three occupations 
including age, gender, marital status at graduation, parental education, parental business 
experience, cumulative GPA, ISU college dummies, and high school rank.  
The trivariate probit model further assumes that:   
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For identification reasons, the variance of iε must equal 1, but we do allow for 
correlated disturbances.  The three correlation coefficients (ρnf, ρnW, ρfW) represent the 
extent to which unobserved covariates jointly determine the occupations.  The trivariate 
probit allows us to identify jjj ξγβ ,, for j= f, n, W and jkρ , kj ≠  
Because entrepreneurial skill is unobservable to the researchers, it will be a 
source of error.  Consequently, the sign of the correlation between 𝜀𝑛 and 𝜀𝑓 will 
depend on the correlation between the unobserved nλ  and fλ .  We expect a positive 
correlation (𝜌𝑛𝑓) between the incentives to start for-profit and nonprofit start-ups due to 
the common unobservable entrepreneurial talents that are presumably valued in both 
sectors.  
We expect that the unobserved skills that lead to specialization and wage work are 
negatively correlated with the unobserved general skills that enhance entrepreneurship 
and so 𝜌𝑛𝑛 < 0 and 𝜌𝑓𝑛 < 0. 
5. Empirical results 
 The results from the trivariate probit model accounting for correlation in the 
occupation-specific error terms are reported in Table 3.  The first three columns include 
no covariate controls.  The second three columns add pre-college characteristics.  The 
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next three columns include more controls for college records.  The last three columns 
report marginal effects associated with all controls included.  Higher value of 
Occupations or Industries indicates a more balanced skill set while lower value of 
Course_specialization indicate a more diverse skill set.  The main implications of the 
results for occupational choices are consistent across different specifications.  
5.1. Do Nonprofit and For-profit entrepreneurs share common human capital?   
 Before getting to our main findings, we first investigate whether nonprofit 
entrepreneurs and for-profit entrepreneurs are more similar to one another than to wage 
workers.  In the second set of results, 5 of 8 covariates have common signs across the 
for-profit and not-for-profit entrepreneurial choices.  In the third set of results, 13 of 16 
covariate pairs have common signs across the two choices.  Parental education and high 
school rank are the only covariates that have different signs across the two 
entrepreneurship groups.  The clearest distinction in factors that raise the probability of 
becoming either entrepreneur type while lowering the probability of wage work are 
growing up with a family or having friends that owned a business, being a member of a 
minority group, being married at graduation, having engineering major, and getting older.   
 We now turn to the main finding on the relationship between balanced skill sets 
and occupational choice.  Having more diverse job experiences across Occupations and 
across Industries raises the probability of starting either or both for-profit and nonprofit 
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enterprises compared to wage work.  As we add more controls, the effect of Occupations 
and Industries gets slightly smaller.  However, regardless of specifications, balanced 
skills from diverse work experience increases the probability of both nonprofit and for-
profit start-ups but decreases the chance to work for pay, consistent with the predictions 
from Lazear’s “Jacks-of-All-Trades” theory.  More precisely, increasing the number of 
occupations held since graduation by one raises the probability of nonprofit startups by 
0.2% and the probability of initiating a for-profit venture by 2.7%.  Meanwhile, it lowers 
the probability of working for wages by 2.9%.  Likewise, working in one more industry 
increases the probability of nonprofit entrepreneurship by 0.3% and for-profit startups by 
1.6%, but it reduces the chance to become a wage worker by 2%.  This evidence 
supports our hypothesis that nonprofit entrepreneurs are also “Jacks-of-All-Trades”.  In 
contrast with Lazear’s (2005) findings, more specialized coursework did not affect the 
likelihood of any of the three occupational choices.35 The marginal effects across 
occupations are virtually zero.    
We investigate the role of the unobservable entrepreneurial skill 𝜆𝑛 and 𝜆𝑓 
through the correlations in the errors reported at the bottom of Table 3.  Consistent with 
a presumed common role of an entrepreneurial skill on both for-profit and not-for-profit 
                                            
35 An alternative measure of academic skill set is a Herfindahl index of academic credit concentration 
denoted by ∑𝑆𝑖𝑖2 , where 𝑆𝑖𝑖  is the share of credits earned in major j by individual i. The results are not 
sensitive to this alternative measure.  
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entrepreneurship, 𝜌𝑛𝑓 > 0 in all specifications.  This positive correlation suggests that 
there exist common unobservable factors that lead to both for-profit and nonprofit 
startups.  On the other hand, regardless of specification, unobserved skills that raise the 
probability of either type of entrepreneurship lower the probability of paid-employment 
(𝜌𝑛𝑛 < 0 and 𝜌𝑓𝑛 < 0). 
 Because our tests of the Jacks-of-all-Trades theory represent three measures: 
Occupations, Industries, and Course_specialization, that will be correlated if chosen to 
raise productivity in wage work or entrepreneurship, the individual coefficients may 
provide an incorrect inference regarding their joint influence on occupational choice.  
Table 4 presents joint tests of the joint significance and impact of the three human capital 
measures.  Panel A shows the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the restriction that the three 
measures have no effect on the probability of selecting each occupation.  Panel B 
provides the test of the hypothesis across the three occupations.  Both within and 
between occupations, the LR test of joint significance soundly rejects the null that the 
three measures do not jointly affect the occupational choice.  
Given that the three measures are jointly important, the overall numerical effect 
of three measures should be the average effect of three measures on individuals for each 
occupation.36  Panel C shows the numerical net effect of three measures for each 
                                            
36 The overall numerical effect of three measures is almost identical for each occupation when we use sum 
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occupation and Panel D reports test of the hypothesis that the sum of each effect equals 
zero.  As shown in Panel C, the net effects of three measures are positive on both 
nonprofit and for-profit venture, while it is negative on paid-employment.  In addition, 
the LR test of joint significance in Panel D soundly rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting 
that the numerical impact of the three measures is jointly influencing occupational choice.  
Accordingly, the observed diversity of academic and occupational skills jointly increases 
the probability of nonprofit sector entrepreneurship, consistent with previous findings of 
for-profit entrepreneurs.  Those diverse skills jointly lower the chance to work for pay.  
The numerical impact of three measures is the weakest in wage sector.  The overall 
marginal effects of three measures are positive on both nonprofit and for-profit startups, 
but it is negative on paid-employment.  An increase in one unit of three measures as a 
balanced skill set raises the probability of nonprofit startups by 0.5% and for-profit 
startups by 4.2%.  On the other hand, it lowers the chance to enter paid-employment by 
4.7%. 
 Our results strongly support the hypothesis that nonprofit and for-profit 
entrepreneurs share similar skill requirements.  Both nonprofit and for-profit 
entrepreneurs are generalists with more balanced skill sets, while those working for pay 
are specialists.  Furthermore, both for-profit and not-for-profit entrepreneurs share 
                                                                                                                                  
of three effects evaluated at sample means. See the Table A-1. 
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common unobserved human capital, consistent with the hypothesized roles of the 
entrepreneurial skill λ.  These findings are consistent with the observation that in the 
sample of Iowa State University alumni, nonprofit entrepreneurs atypically had also 
started a for-profit business and vice versa.  
6. Conclusion 
In Lazear (2005)’s model of entrepreneurship, individuals who are broadly 
trained are more likely to become entrepreneurs whereas individuals with specialized 
skills tend to work for someone else.  The entrepreneur’s more diverse skills are 
important to organize the specialists they hire.  Extending the Lazear’s model, we show 
in theory that diverse skills should have a positive effect on the choice of both nonprofit 
and for-profit start-ups over the alternative of paid-employment.  Accordingly, this 
chapter examines whether Lazear’s model can also explain nonprofit entrepreneurial 
choice.  In particular, this study tests whether observed diversity of skills increase the 
probability of nonprofit entrepreneurship and whether unobservable talents that lead to 
nonprofit startup are positively correlated with the unobservable skills that lead to for-
profit start-ups.   
 Using a sample of Iowa State University alumni who graduated between 1982 
and 2006, we find that observed diversity of academic and occupational skills increases 
the probability of both nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurship, while those skills lower 
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the chance to work for pay.  Nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs share similar 
observed skill requirements.  Two error terms between for-profit start-up and nonprofit 
start-up are positively correlated, indicating the existence of common unobservable 
factors that lead to both for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurship.  Indeed, nonprofit 
entrepreneurs are also “Jacks-of-All-Trades”.   
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Table 1. Number and percent of for-profit and nonprofit entrepreneurs in ISU alumni data 
 For-profit entrepreneur?  
Nonprofit entrepreneur? No Yes Total 
No 4,467 809 5,276 
Row% (84.7%) (15.3%) (100%) 
Column% [98.3%] [92.8%] [97.4%] 
Yes 77 63 140 
Row% (55%) (45%) (100%) 
Column% [1.7%] [7.2%] [2.6%] 
Total 4,544 872 5,416 
Row% (83.9%) (16.1%) (100%) 
Column% [100%] [100%] [100%] 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Mean [Std] 
 Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-employment 
Balanced skill sets of human capital   
OCCUPATIONS 2.06 [1.59] 2.22 [1.70] 1.62 [1.12] 
INDUSTRIES 2.14 [1.36] 2.06 [1.22] 1.70 [1.06] 
Course_specialization 13.41 [8.05] 12.83[7.26] 13.51 [7.21] 
Other human capital    
Male 0.61 [0.49] 0.67 [0.47] 0.59 [0.49] 
Married at graduation  0.14 [0.35] 0.11 [0.31] 0.10 [0.30] 
White 0.94 [0.24] 0.94 [0.24] 0.95 [0.22] 
Mother education 4.58 [1.59] 4.53 [1.56] 4.72 [1.54] 
Father education 4.65 [1.71] 4.83 [1.80] 4.91 [1.72] 
Either of parents started business 0.57 [0.50] 0.56 [0.50] 0.47 [0.50] 
Close friends started business 0.29 [0.46] 0.28 [0.45] 0.47 [0.50] 
High school rank 68.30 [33.14] 62.18 [34.62] 70.59 [31.16] 
Cumulative GPA 3.02 [0.57] 2.96 [0.58] 3.05 [0.59] 
Age at graduation 23.82 [3.70] 24.10 [4.06] 23.50 [3.04] 
Current age 41.01 [7.35] 40.50 [7.94] 36.88 [8.47] 
College    
Agriculture and Life Sciences 0.22 [0.42] 0.16 [0.37] 0.18 [0.39] 
Business 0.18 [0.38] 0.20 [0.40] 0.16 [0.37] 
Design 0.15 [0.36] 0.18 [0.38] 0.17 [0.38] 
Engineering 0.13 [0.34] 0.09 [0.29] 0.07 [0.25] 
Human Sciences 0.23 [0.42] 0.26 [0.44] 0.29 [0.45] 
Note: The number in the square bracket is standard deviation.  
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Table 3. Results of the estimation of the trivariate probit model 
          Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Nonprofit 
Startup 
For-Profit 
Startup 
Paid 
Employm
ent 
Nonprofit 
Startup 
For-Profit 
Startup 
Paid-
Employm
ent 
Nonprofit 
Startup 
For-Profit 
Startup 
Paid-
Employm
ent 
Non- 
profit 
startup 
For-
Profit 
Startup 
Paid-
Employ
ment 
             
Balanced skill sets             
Occupations  0.062*** 
(2.36) 
0.191*** 
(11.22) 
-0.047*** 
(2.72) 
0.046* 
(1.64) 
0.157*** 
(8.79) 
-0.074*** 
(4.07) 
0.039 
(1.36) 
0.150***   
(8.25) 
-0.074*** 
(4.00) 
0.002 
 
0.027 
 
-0.029 
 
Industries 0.105*** 
(3.37) 
0.104*** 
(5.45) 
-0.052*** 
(2.53) 
0.084*** 
(2.54) 
0.093*** 
(4.63) 
-0.014 
(0.64) 
0.076** 
(2.26) 
0.089***   
(4.35) 
-0.006 
(0.26) 
0.003 
 
0.016 
 
-0.019 
 
Course_specializa
tion 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.004 
(1.34) 
0.004 
(1.39) 
0.006 
(1.10) 
-0.002 
(0.51) 
0.003 
(0.99) 
0.003 
(0.46) 
-0.003 
(0.96) 
0.004   
(1.20) 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
Controls             
Age    0.119*** 
(2.65) 
0.062*** 
(3.04) 
-0.005 
(0.27) 
0.112*** 
(2.46) 
0.052*** 
(2.38) 
-0.015 
(0.69) 
0.005 
 
0.012 
 
-0.017 
 
Age^2    -0.001** 
(2.18) 
-0.001* 
(1.86) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.001** 
(1.98) 
-0.000 
(1.29) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Male    0.114 
(1.41) 
0.169*** 
(3.67) 
0.485*** 
(10.36) 
0.084 
(0.96) 
0.133*** 
(2.65) 
0.433*** 
(8.54) 
0.001 
 
0.009 
 
-0.010 
 
White    -0.065 
(0.37) 
-0.249*** 
(2.60) 
0.056 
(0.54) 
-0.055 
(0.31) 
-0.219** 
(2.26) 
0.061 
(0.58) 
-0.001 
 
-0.037 
 
0.038 
 
Father education     -0.034 
(1.35) 
0.031** 
(2.06) 
-0.059*** 
(3.74) 
-0.036 
(1.41) 
0.028* 
(1.87) 
-0.060*** 
(3.77) 
-0.002 
 
0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
Mother education    0.017 
(0.58) 
-0.014 
(0.81) 
0.028 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(0.44) 
-0.015 
(0.90) 
0.027 
(1.53) 
0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.004 
 
Either of parents 
started business 
   0.158** 
(2.05) 
0.190*** 
(4.27) 
-0.150*** 
(3.27) 
0.125 
(1.55) 
0.155*** 
(3.38) 
-0.127*** 
(2.71) 
0.006 
 
0.030 
 
-0.036 
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High school rank    0.001 
(0.93) 
-0.003*** 
(4.30) 
0.000 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(1.20) 
-0.003*** 
(3.85) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Married at 
graduation 
      0.208* 
(1.81) 
0.124* 
(1.74) 
-0.078 
(1.09) 
0.011 
 
0.024 
 
-0.035 
 
Close friends 
started business 
      -0.187** 
(2.26) 
-0.322***   
(6.85) 
0.115*** 
(2.43) 
-0.008 -0.059 
 
0.066 
 
Cumulative GPA       0.011 
(0.15) 
0.034 
(0.84) 
-0.046 
(1.08) 
0.000 
 
0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
College             
Agriculture   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
    0.223 
(1.50) 
0.015 
(0.18) 
0.013 
(0.17)
0.012 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.004 
 
Business       0.171 
(1.12) 
0.152*   
(1.82) 
0.022 
(0.27) 
0.007 
 
0.016 
 
-0.023 
 
Design       0.095   
(0.59) 
0.044 
(0.49) 
0.143* 
(1.68) 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
-0.009 
 
Engineering       0.490*** 
(2.83) 
0.321*** 
(3.09) 
0.015 
(0.15) 
0.033 
 
0.054 
 
-0.086 
 
Human Sciences       0.116 
(0.76) 
0.092 
(1.13) 
0.217*** 
(2.69) 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
-0.009 
 
Constant -2.269*** 
(22.02) 
-1.466*** 
(24.19) 
1.234*** 
(19.83) 
-5.011*** 
(5.71) 
-2.910*** 
(7.11) 
1.365*** 
(3.46) 
-4.960*** 
(5.25) 
-2.721***   
(5.88) 
1.549***   
(3.41) 
   
𝜌𝑛𝑓  0.294*** 
(6.81) 
  0.284*** 
(6.35) 
  0.281*** 
(6.09) 
    
𝜌𝑛𝑛  -0.394*** 
(16.09) 
  -0.428*** 
(16.72) 
  -0.428*** 
(16.66) 
    
𝜌𝑓𝑛  -0.109*** 
(2.38) 
  -0.095* 
(1.90) 
  -0.164*** 
(3.24) 
    
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis.  */**/** significance level at 10%/5%/1%, respectively.   
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Table 4. Joint effects of three human capital measures (Occupation, Industry, Course_specialization) 
Panel A    
 Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-
employment 
Within occupation 
(𝐻0:𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0) 2 (3) 10.09χ =  
p=0.018 
2 (3) 122.26χ =  
p=0.000 
2 (3) 20.50χ =  
p=0.000 
Panel B    
Across occupations 
(𝐻0:𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0) Nonprofit entrepreneurship For-profit entrepreneurship Paid-employment 
Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
 2 (6) 127.44χ =  
p=0.000 
2 (6) 29.60χ =  
p=0.000 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
  2 (6) 128.48χ =
p=0.000 
Panel C     
 Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-
employment 
The average effect of 
three measures on 
individuals :  (𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3)���������������������������� 0.278 0.472 -0.070 
Panel D    
(𝐻0:𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 0) 2 (1) 10.20χ =  
p=0.0015 
2 (1) 103.03χ =  
p=0.0000 
2 (1) 9.76χ =  
p=0.0018 
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Table A-1. Joint effects of three human capital measures (Occupation, Industry, Course_specialization) 
    
 Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-
employment 
Sum of three human 
capital effects evaluated 
at sample means:  
𝛽1𝑋�1 + 𝛽2𝑋�2 + 𝛽3𝑋�3 0.230 0.353 -0.073 
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Table A-2. Distribution of three employments across industry 
Industry 
Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-employment 
Agriculture  5.00% 6.19% 4.42% 
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation  2.14% 1.83% 1.17% 
Construction  5.71% 4.82% 3.17% 
Finance/Insurance 4.29% 5.28% 6.16% 
Hospitality  0.71% 0.80% 0.77% 
Manufacturing  4.29% 6.65% 9.48% 
Mining  0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 
Real Estate  1.43% 2.06% 0.62% 
Social Services  1.43% 0.80% 0.96% 
Transportation & Utilities  0.71% 2.64% 3.91% 
Accommodation & Food Services  0.00% 0.46% 0.36% 
Communications  2.86 % 4.13% 1.93% 
Education  11.43% 5.96% 9.03% 
Government/Military  10.00% 3.90% 6.12% 
Legal  2.14% 1.38% 1.38% 
Medicine/Health Care  2.14% 3.21% 4.78% 
Non-profit  3.57% 0.80% 1.47% 
Retail  0.71% 2.29% 1.85% 
Information Technology  7.86% 8.72% 5.91% 
Other  7.14% 10.78% 8.63% 
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Table A-3. Distribution of three employments across occupation 
Occupation 
Nonprofit 
entrepreneurship 
For-profit 
entrepreneurship 
Paid-
employment 
Marketing & sales managers  18.57% 23.85% 12.94% 
Financial managers  12.14% 12.50% 8.20% 
Industrial production managers  4.29% 4.59% 4.53% 
Transportation, storage, &  distribution managers   2.14% 4.01% 3.19% 
Service occupations  10.71% 14.11% 11.60% 
Office, clerical, & administrative support occupations  16.43% 14.22% 11.88% 
Construction & extraction occupation  7.14% 7.68% 4.27% 
Transportation & material moving occupations  1.43% 4.01% 3.08% 
Chief executives  22.86% 18.00% 4.23% 
Computer & information systems managers   10.00% 10.67% 7.42% 
Human resources managers   7.86% 5.73% 3.06% 
Purchasing managers   5.00% 6.19% 3.36% 
Professional & technical occupations  57.86% 54.93% 59.49% 
Sales & related occupations  18.57% 26.95% 17.26% 
Farming, fishing, & forestry occupations  7.86% 9.40% 4.21% 
Production occupations: Laborers & operatives  3.57% 5.50% 3.36% 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation consists of four chapters exploring the roles of risk preference and 
skills in various labor supply settings.  The first three chapters focus on the role of measured 
risk aversion on economic choices and the fourth chapter focuses on the role of observed and 
unobserved entrepreneurial skills on starting a nonprofit enterprise.    
The first three chapters use NLSY79 data to show that commonly used measures of risk 
preferences do not behave as theory would suggest in many labor market settings.  First, while 
we confirm prominent differences in risk aversion between men and women, those gender 
differences in risk aversion do not explain gender gaps in entrepreneurship, earnings, and hours 
of work decision.   
Second, the hypothesis that more risk averse entrepreneurs survive longer in business 
than their less risk averse counterparts is soundly rejected.  This surprising finding calls into 
question the interpretation of common measures of risk aversion as measures of taste for risk.  
Instead, measured risk attitudes perform as if they are indicators of entrepreneurial ability–the 
least risk averse are apparently those who can best assess and manage risks.  Indeed, our 
interpretation is consistent with the work of recent experimental studies that find that the less risk 
averse has higher cognitive ability.   
Third, the theoretical presumption of stable risk preferences is soundly rejected.  
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Individual risk preferences are changing over time in response to personal economic 
circumstances such as income and employment status.  In particular, recent employment spells 
increases risk aversion whereas recent unemployment spells decrease risk aversion.  This 
finding shows that measured risk aversion cannot be treated as a fixed attitude toward risk.  
Because risk preferences respond to current economic circumstances, they cannot be viewed as 
causal factors in studies of contemporaneous economic decisions such as occupational choice, 
earnings, or entrepreneurship. 
The last chapter uses a data set composed of Iowa State University alumni from 1982-
2006 to show that observed diverse skills increase the probability of nonprofit entrepreneurship.  
This is consistent with previous finding regarding how these same skills affect the decision to 
become a for-profit entrepreneur.  In addition, unobservable talents that increase probability of 
for-profit startups are positively correlated with the unobservable skills that lead to nonprofit 
start-ups, consistent with a presumed entrepreneurial skill that underlies the Lazear Jack-of-All-
Trades model.  Apparently, nonprofit sector entrepreneurs and for-profit sector entrepreneurs 
share common human capital that is crucial for successful entrepreneurship in both sectors.  
Indeed, those who start a for-profit venture also opt for starting a nonprofit enterprise, and vice 
versa.  
 This dissertation focused on individual decisions made in isolation.  It is plausible that 
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married couples make joint decisions regarding one spouse’s entrepreneurial choices.  That 
leads to interesting questions for future research including whether entrepreneurship is tied to the 
attributes of the spouse, whether one spouse’s entrepreneurial entry alters the labor supply or 
occupational choices of the partner, and whether marriage serves as a risk-management 
mechanism for entrepreneurs by providing a second, more secure source of income.   
 
